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ABSTRACT
Over the past fifty years, the battle lines in Virginia redistrict-
ing have shifted from within-party fighting among Democrats,
primarily over malapportionment favoring rural interests over
urban interests, to battles over voting rights. In this article, we
provide a detailed history of redistricting in Virginia and a quan-
titative analysis of current adopted and proposed redistricting
plans. Surprisingly, although the outcome remained partisan, the
most recent round of redistricting included an unprecedented lev-
el of public engagement, catalyzed by information technology. A
Virginia commission convened by the governor and the participa-
tion of students in the most recent round of Virginia's redistrict-
ing demonstrate that redistricting does not have to be left up to
the "professionals." Further, our analysis suggests that state-
level reform in the form of an independent commission that strict-
ly follows a set of administrative criteria likely would modestly
benefit Republicans.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2012 general election, Virginia Republican candidates
for the United States House of Representatives won a combined
70,736 more votes than Democratic candidates out of the 3.7 mil-
lion votes cast for the major party candidates, yet won eight of the
state's eleven House seats.' Thus is the power of gerrymandering.
Legislative boundaries are periodically redrawn ostensibly to
achieve federal and state constitutional and statutory goals.2 The
most important federal criterion is equalizing districts' popula-
tions following the decennial federal census,3 which effectively
means redistricting must take place every ten years.4 Virginia is
also subject to provisions of the federal Voting Rights Act de-
signed to protect minority representation.5 Virginia's current con-
stitution further requires congressional and state legislative dis-
tricts to be contiguous and compact.' These administrative goals
are nominally devoid of political considerations, but such consid-
erations are at the forefront for those who conduct redistricting.
Redistricting authorities-which are often state legislatures, as is
the case in Virginia-have a direct interest in how new district
boundaries affect legislative majorities, individual careers, and
racial representation.
Despite the high stakes that consume politicians and can have
dramatic effects on electoral outcomes, the public is poorly in-
formed about redistricting.7 Policy advocates express concern that
"redistricting authorities maintain their monopoly by imposing
1. November 6, 2012 General Election Official Results, VA. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS,
https://www.voterinfo.sbe.virginia.gov/election/DATA/2012/68C30477-AAF2-46DD-994E-
5D3BE 8A89C9B/Official6_s.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
2. See JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
REDISTRICTING 2 (2010), available at http:/Ibrennan.3cdn.net/7182a7e7624ed5265d_6im
622teh.pdf (providing a comprehensive review of state and federal redistricting processes
and laws).
3. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
18 (1964).
4. See Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the 'Re" out of Redistricting:
State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1261 (2007).
5. 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.4, 51 app. (2012) (listing Virginia as one of several states which
must submit new redistricting plans to the Department of Justice or the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for preclearance).
6. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
7. Michael P. McDonald, Legislative Redistricting, in DEMOCRACY IN THE STATES:
EXPERIMENTS IN ELECTION REFORM 147, 156 (Bruce Cain, Todd Donovan & Caroline Tol-
bert eds., 2008).
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high barriers to transparency and public participation."' A prima-
ry way some redistricting authorities have restricted information
is by limiting timely public access to the redistricting data and
software required to draw districts.9 In the absence of legal alter-
natives against which to benchmark a redistricting authority's
plan, the public cannot assess if alternatives exist that can better
achieve various goals.
With this in mind, we, the authors, embarked upon an ambi-
tious project to leverage information technology advances to cre-
ate an open-source, web-based redistricting software called Dis-
trictBuilder. ° Our goal was to expand the scope of public
participation and enhance transparency in redistricting by
providing the public with the same tools and data available to re-
districting authorities, allowing members of the public to draw
their own redistricting plans. In 2011, we elevated the Virginia
public's engagement in redistricting to a level never seen before
in American politics. Virginia was the first state in which we pub-
licly deployed the DistrictBuilder redistricting software to sup-
port a statewide redistricting competition of college students. The
competition was hosted by the Judy Ford Wason Center for Pub-
lic Policy at Christopher Newport University, and was later used
to support mapping by Governor McDonnell's Independent Bipar-
tisan Advisory Redistricting Commission ("IBARC").
The IBARC's activity and the student competition resulted in
public input into Virginia's redistricting process where little had
existed previously. The public and the media were thereby better
informed about the redistricting process and the range of poten-
tial redistricting alternatives. These efforts had a modest effect
on the official redistricting process as well. Our goal here is to
document these unprecedented activities and assess how the re-
districting plans generated by the legislature differed from the
8. Micah Altman, Thomas E. Mann, Michael P. McDonald & Norman J.
Ornstein, Principles for Transparency and Public Participation in Redistricting,
BROOKINGS INST. (June 17, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/06/17-
redistricting-statement. This statement was formally endorsed by Americans for Redis-
tricting Reform, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, Campaign Legal
Center, Center for Governmental Studies, Center for Voting and Democracy, Common
Cause, Demos, and the League of Women Voters of the United States. Id.
9. Cf. Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers
in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POLY 69, 103-05 (2010) (offering suggestions
to improve transparency).
10. DISTRICTBUILDER, http://www.districtbuilder.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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IBARC's adopted plans and the student-drawn plans. Placing
these efforts in the context of the history of redistricting in the
Commonwealth, we illuminate future possibilities for reform ef-
forts in Virginia.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Early Experience
Virginia's experience with gerrymandering predates the infa-
mous 1812 Massachusetts State Senate district from which the
name "gerrymandering" was coined to describe the political ma-
nipulation of district boundaries. 1 Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry,
working through the legislature he helped elect, designed a dis-
tricting plan for the first congressional election in 1789 with the
intention of denying his political nemesis and author of the new
constitution, James Madison, a seat in the new United States
House of Representatives. 12 The district combined Madison's
home located in Orange County with seven Anti-Federalist coun-
ties. 3 Madison was forced to campaign, something he reportedly
detested doing, against his well-liked opponent, James Monroe.'4
Henry's manipulation lacked the brutal efficiency of the epony-
mous gerrymander, which limited Federalist candidates to 27% of
the seats despite winning a majority of votes across all Senate
districts," and Madison won his election. 6
Madison's vignette reveals that Virginians were familiar with
redistricting at the country's founding. Even before the federal
constitution was implemented, the Virginia Constitution of 1776
described how the House of Delegates districts were to be appor-
tioned: each county was given two delegates, and named cities
11. Seegenerally John Ward Dean, The Gerrymander, 46NEW ENG. HIST. &
GENEALOGICAL REG. 374, 374-83 (1892) (describing the history of gerrymandering). Al-
though the original gerrymander is attributed to Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Curry,
he merely signed into law a plan enacted by the state legislature. See id. at 381-82.
12. See Paul J. Weber, Madison's Opposition to a Second Convention, 20 POLITY 498,
513-14 (1988).
13. Id. at 514.
14. Id.
15. See S. E. Morison, Elbridge Gerry, Gentleman-Democrat, 2 NEW ENG. Q. 6, 31
(1929).
16. Weber, supra note 12, at 516.
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and boroughs were given one delegate. 7 The General Assembly
could, at its discretion, award representation to other sub-county
governments, but these governmental units had to meet a mini-
mal population threshold.'" Single-member senate districts were
drawn out of whole counties.19 The allocation's inherent malap-
portionment was designed to favor eastern interests over those in
the west." Thomas Jefferson, an opponent of this division of polit-
ical power, authored alternative-and rejected-Virginia consti-
tutions in 1776 and 1783 that favored allocation of districts to
each county "in proportion to the number of its qualified elec-
tors. 21
The Constitution of 1776 did not describe who was responsible
for assigning counties to districts or any timetable for changes to
their district boundaries. These shortcomings were rectified in
the Constitution of 1830, which described how the General As-
sembly would "re-apportion" itself once every ten years in years
ending in "1.,,2 A two-thirds vote of each chamber was required to
enact a new districting plan.23 The constitution also described the
circumstances under which a redistricting would be required fol-
lowing the creation of a new county or other sub-governmental
17. VA. CONST. of 1776 ("[Tlhe House of Delegates, [shall] consist of two representa-
tives to be chosen for each county, and for the district of West Augusta, annually, of such
men as actually reside in and are freeholders, or duly qualified according to law, and also
one Delegate or Representative to be chosen annually for the city of Williamsburg, and one
for the borough of Norfolk, and a Representative for each of such other cities and boroughs
as may hereafter be allowed particular representation by the legislature; but when any
city or borough shall so decrease as that the number of persons having right of suffrage
therein shall have been, for the space of seven years successively, less than half the num-
ber of voters in some one county in Virginia, such city or borough thenceforward shall
cease to send a Delegate or Representative to the Assembly.").
18. Id.
19. Id. ("[Tlhe Senate, (shall] consist of twenty four members, of whom thirteen shall
constitute a House to proceed on business, for whose elections the different counties shall
be divided into twenty-four districts, and each county of the respective district, at the time
of the election of its Delegates, shall vote for one Senator, who is actually a resident and
freeholder within the district, or duly qualified according to law, and is upwards of twenty-
five years of age; and the sheriffs of each county, within five days at farthest after the last
county election in the district, shall meet at some convenient place, and from the place, so
taken in their respective counties, return as a Senator the man who shall have the great-
est number of votes in the whole district.").
20. See ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION 18 (1965).
21. Id. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 4.
23. Id. art. III, § 5.
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unit.24 However, House of Delegates districts were no longer to be
apportioned by population.25 Instead, House of Delegates and
Senate districts were required only to respect political bounda-
ries.26 The "opinion of the general assembly" determined districts'
population equality.27 The Constitution of 1830 further described
the drawing of United States congressional districts, requiring
single-member congressional districts to respect existing political
boundaries and be of relatively equal population.2"
The Virginia Constitution of 1851 amended the redistricting
process again. The new constitution included provisions for the
circumstance of a divided legislature that could not agree on an
apportionment plan.2 9 Each chamber would forward redistricting
plans for both chambers to the governor, who would call a
statewide referendum on which of the two plans to adopt for each
chamber. ° In the event that the General Assembly did not for-
ward plans to the governor, an election would be held to select
one of two principles for drawing districts of each chamber, a "suf-
frage basis" or a "mixed basis."" A "suffrage basis" was defined as
apportioning districts to governmental units based on their voting
population, while a "mixed basis" was apportioned partially on
24. Id. art. III, § 4.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id. art. III, § 6 ("The whole number of members to which the state may at any
time be entitled in the house of representatives of the United States, shall be apportioned
as nearly as may be amongst the several counties, cities, boroughs and towns of the state,
according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
number of free persons, including those bound in service for a term of years and excluding
Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.").
29. VA. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 5.
30. Id. ("[Iun the event the general assembly, at the first or any subsequent period of
reapportionment, shall fail to agree upon a principle of representation and to reapportion
representation in accordance therewith, each house shall separately propose a scheme of
representation, containing a principle or rule for the house of delegates, in connection with
a principle or rule for the senate. And it shall be the duty of the general assembly, at the
same session, to certify to the governor the principles or rules of representation which the
respective houses may separately propose, to be applied in making reapportionments in
the senate and in the house of delegates: and the governor shall, as soon thereafter as may
be, by proclamation, make known the propositions of the respective houses, and require
the voters of the commonwealth to assemble at such time, as he shall appoint, at their
lawful places of voting, and decide by their votes between the propositions thus present-
ed.").
31. Id. Voters could also chose a pure taxation basis for the draining of senate dis-
tricts. Id.
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population and partially on paid taxes.32 The General Assembly
would thereafter be obliged to draw districts according to the ba-
sis of apportionment selected by the voters.33 The House of Dele-
gates districts34 and Senate districts31 would be drawn out of coun-
ties, cities, and towns. The congressional districts were to be
"formed respectively of contiguous counties, cities and towns, be
compact, and include, as nearly as may be, an equal number of
the population, upon which is based representation in the House
of Representatives of the United States."36 Likely, contiguity and
population equality requirements were adopted to conform to
norms articulated in federal statutes.37
During the Civil War, Union sympathizers wrote the Virginia
Constitution of 1864 for the portion of the state under Union con-
trol, which was enacted statewide following the Confederacy's
surrender in May 1865.3' The constitution recognized the newly
created state of West Virginia," which, from the standpoint of re-
districting, created dramatic changes in Virginia's territory and
population. The constitution reiterated that the General Assem-
bly was responsible for drawing House of Delegates and Senate
districts, comprised of whole governmental subunits, but required
districts to be apportioned explicitly on a population basis-a de-
parture from the option of a suffrage or mixed basis found in the
Constitution of 1851.40 However, the constitution was silent on
the required degree of population equality for state legislative
districts. Congressional districts were to be "formed respectively
of contiguous counties, cities and towns, be compact, and include,
as nearly as may be, an equal number of population."'"
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See id. art. IV, § 2.
35. Id. art. IV, § 3 ("Each county, city and town of the respective districts, at the time
of the first election of its delegate or delegates under this constitution, shall vote for one
senator.").
36. Id. art. IV, § 14.
37. See Law of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 ('ID]istricts [shall be] composed of
contiguous territory equal in number to the number of representatives to which said State
may be entitled ... ").
38. ARMISTEAD R. LONG, THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: AN ANNOTATED EDITION
161 (1901).
39. VA. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 27.
40. See id. art. IV, § 6.
41. Id. art. IV, § 14.
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The Virginia Constitution of 1870 was written in the aftermath
of the Civil War, and with regards to redistricting, it endured un-
til 1971. The constitution again described apportioning House of
Delegates districts among counties and cities.42 Senate districts
were to be drawn out of counties, cities, and towns.43 The appar-
ent discrepancy lay in the fact that House of Delegates districts,
for the first time, consisted of multi-member districts." At adop-
tion of the constitution, these ranged in size from one member for
many localities, to eight members for a district that included
Henrico County and the City of Richmond.45 Later, Senate dis-
tricts would also be multi-member.4" Floterial, or overlapping, dis-
tricts were also permitted. 47 The constitution required redistrict-
ing to occur every ten years following an enumeration,
presumably that of the federal census. 8 Congressional districts
were to be drawn following the national apportionment of dis-
tricts to the states out of counties, cities, and towns, but had fur-
ther contiguity, compactness, and equal-population require-
49
ments.
The Constitution of 1870 was next fully revised in 1971, follow-
ing the upheaval of the reapportionment revolution decisions by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1960s.5' As related by Robert Aus-
tin, in the intervening years, the legislature would typically con-
vene a redistricting study commission in the year of a federal
census to recommend how to proceed with redistricting.5' Despite
this, once the commission had reported, the leadership would
42. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. V, § 2.
43. Id. art. V, § 3.
44. See id. art. V, § 2.
45. Id.
46. See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 687 (1964) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 24-14 (Repi.
Vol. 1964) (dividing Virginia into thirty-six districts for the allocation of forty senatorial
seats)).
47. Robert. J. Austin, Virginia, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS: THE HISTORY OF
REDISTRICTING IN THE 50 STATES 334, 334, 338 n.1 (Leroy Hardy et al. eds., 1981).
48. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. V, § 4.
49. Id. art. V, § 13 ("In the apportionment the state shall be divided into districts, cor-
responding in number with the representatives to which it may be entitled in the house of
representatives of the congress of the United States, which shall be formed, respectively,
of contiguous counties, cities and towns, be compact, and include, as nearly as may be, an
equal number of population.").
50. See infra Section II.B.
51. Austin, supra note 47, at 334.
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take back control, ignore the commission's recommendations, and
redraw districts as they saw fit.52
The Supreme Court of Virginia entered the political thicket of
redistricting to enforce state constitutional requirements, unlike
the federal courts during the period.53 In 1932, William Moseley
Brown filed as a candidate for the House of Representatives to
run in an at-large congressional district, but was denied by the
secretary of the Commonwealth because Virginia had enacted a
single-member congressional redistricting plan to select its nine
representatives.54 The court found that the population deviation
of 152,720 persons between the largest and smallest congression-
al district violated the Virginia Constitution's population equality
requirement." The court ordered the state to hold at-large elec-
tions for all nine members, as required by federal law when no le-
gal congressional redistricting plan is in effect, thereby granting
Brown's candidacy." The state subsequently enacted a single-
member district plan for the 1934 congressional elections that
addressed the court's concerns. 57 The willingness of the Supreme
Court of Virginia to enforce state districting criteria would subse-
quently entice litigants to contest redistricting plans in both fed-
eral and state court.
B. The 1960s: Reapportionment Revolution
Following the 1960 federal census, the redistricting of Virginia
loomed as a major political battle.58 Democrats held comfortable
majorities in both chambers, so the political divide was not along
party lines, but by region.55 The state faced population imbalances
across districts that were a result of the rapid population growth
in the urban areas during the 1950s as well as the malappor-
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (declining to invalidate
challenged Illinois redistricting laws because of the particularly political nature of the is-
sue).
54. Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 105 (Va. 1932).
55. Id. at 111.
56. Id.
57. S.B. 3, 1933 Gen. Assemb., Ex. Sess. (Va. 1934); Redistricting Bill Signed By Gov.
Peery: Long Fight Ends as Holt Bill Divides Va. in 9 Districts, WASH. POST & TIMES-
HERALD, Feb. 16, 1934, at 5.
58. Austin, supra note 47, at 335.
59. Id. at 334.
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tioned 1952 plans.6" Urban areas were under-represented in the
House of Delegates by eight seats and in the Senate by three
seats, while urban congressional districts exceeded the ideal pop-
ulation by a quarter to a third.6
After three attempts, the General Assembly failed to convene
its usual redistricting study commission.6 2 Democratic Governor
J. Lindsay Almond then appointed a commission," whose perfor-
mance would be replicated fifty years later by Governor Bob
McDonnell's commission.64 The commission was composed of an
equal number of legislators and non-legislators, with one of each
selected from each of the state's ten congressional districts.6 In
an address to the opening session on April 24, 1961, Governor
Almond tasked his commission to "apply the principles of practi-
cal equality of representation . . . in consideration of all relevant
factors" as it prepared proposals to deliver to the state legislature
in 1962.66
Final commission plans were drafted prior to the 1961 state
elections, but Governor Almond decided to withhold their release
until after the election, to the dismay of the Republicans who
charged that the delay was designed to hide the issue from vot-
ers.67 Republican fears were partially justified in that the com-
mission's recommendation provided Northern Virginia-then a
Republican stronghold-with only half of the increase in repre-
sentation it warranted by virtue of its population growth.68 While
Republicans were disappointed, the new plan embodied a dra-
matic shift in power to urban areas of twelve House seats and
four Senate seats, producing a balance between urban and rural
areas in the House and a urban majority in the Senate.66 Not sur-
60. See Virginia Start Asked on Reapportionment, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, Feb.
13, 1960, at 20.
61. Austin, supra note 47, at 335.
62. Almond to Appoint 20 to Commission for Redistricting, WASH. POST & TIMES-
HERALD, Jan. 11, 1961, at B04 [hereinafter Almond to Appoint].
63. Id.
64. See infra Section II.G.
65. Almond to Appoint, supra note 62.
66. Equitable Redistrict Plan Urged, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, Apr. 25, 1961, at
B12.
67. GOP Sees Districting Plan Delay, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, Nov. 1, 1961, at
Bll.
68. Elsie Carper, Redistricting Plan Is Blow to North Virginia, WASH. POST & TIMES-
HERALD, Nov. 25, 1961, at D1.
69. Helen Dewar, Redistrict Plan Hailed by Almond, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD,
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prisingly, rural Democratic members in both chambers rejected
the commission's proposals and enacted their own "token" plans
that did little to rectify existing malapportionment. 0 Newly elect-
ed Democratic Governor Albertis S. Harrison, in contrast to his
predecessor, deferred to the legislature, calling the plans "not un-
fair by any means."" Thus ended Virginia's first experiment with
a gubernatorial redistricting commission. In hindsight, Governor
Almond could take the high road of convening his commission and
championing population equality because he knew that, by virtue
of his expired term following the 1961 election, he would not have
to enforce his commission's recommendations through what
might have been a politically difficult veto of his party's legisla-
tive plans.
Immediately following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1962 Baker v.
Carr decision,72 four Northern Virginia members of the General
Assembly filed a federal complaint alleging that unequal state
legislative district populations violated the federal constitution's
Equal Protection Clause. 3 The League of Women Voters of Vir-
ginia" and the Virginia Methodist Conference 5 also advocated
against the newly enacted plans. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that "[n]either of the houses of the Virginia General
Assembly ... is apportioned sufficiently on a population basis to
be constitutionally sustainable."76 The Court also rejected the
Commonwealth's argument that large military populations war-
ranted under-representation for Norfolk, finding that the Com-
monwealth provided no justification for making such an adjust-
ment.7 The Court then deferred to the legislature, allowing
legislators to correct malapportionment before the 1965 state
Nov. 26, 1961, at D18.
70. See Robert E. Baker, Byrd Organization Nails Down Rural Legislative Control:
Senate and House Junk Commission Redistricting Plan, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD,
Mar. 10, 1962, at B1.
71. Id.
72. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
73. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1964). The lead plaintiff in the lawsuit was
Delegate Harrison Mann of Arlington County. See Ralph Eisenberg, Legislative Reappor-
tionment and Congressional Redistricting in Virginia, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295, 304
n.32 (1966).
74. Women to Enter Districting Fight, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, Apr. 7, 1962, at
C06.
75. Methodists Rap 'Token" Redistrict, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, June 14, 1962,
at C012.
76. Davis, 377 U.S. at 690.
77. Id. at 691-92.
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elections."8 The congressional districts were similarly redrawn in
1965 in response to a Supreme Court of Virginia ruling that the
congressional districts violated state and federal constitutional
equal-population requirements.79
C. The 1970s: Reapportionment Revolution Aftermath
The 1969 State Commission on Constitutional Revision was
tasked with addressing outdated provisions of the state constitu-
tion. o The commission proposed to eliminate the provision requir-
ing respect for political subdivisions, which was seen to be at odds
with the U.S. Supreme Court's new equal-population standard.81
Voters in the 1970 general election approved, in one vote, the
package of wide-sweeping changes proposed by the commission,
which also included protections for the environment and educa-
tion. 2 The constitutional amendments, which remain current, re-
quire that "[e]very electoral district shall be composed of contigu-
ous and compact territory and shall be so constituted as to give,
as nearly as is practicable, representation in proportion to the
population of the district."83
Following the 1970 census, the primary redistricting issue was
again how to reconcile urban population growth with rural politi-
cal interests. 4 However, this time the legislature operated under
the new federal mandate for population equality s And, for the
first time, plans created by the legislature would be subject to ap-
proval from the Department of Justice or District Court for the
78. Id. at 692-93.
79. Wilkins v. Davis, 139 S.E.2d 849, 855-56 (Va. 1965); see H.B. 1, 1965 Gen. As-
semb., Ex. Sess. (Va. 1965).
80. Helen Dewar, Proposed Virginia Constitutional Revisions Would Broaden Voting
Regulations, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, Jan. 30, 1969, at F4.
81. See id. Justice Douglas's opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), was the
first use of the phrase "one person, one vote." Id. at 381. The Court in Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964), would later expand on this notion, finding that the "overriding objec-
tive [of redistricting] must be substantial equality of population among the various dis-
tricts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other
citizen in the State." Id. at 579.
82. J.Y. Smith, Virginians Vote 2 to I to Change Constitution, WASH. POST & TIMES-
HERALD, Nov. 4, 1970, at A012.
83. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
84. See Helen Dewar, Va. Senate Panel Votes Redistricting, WASH. POST & TIMES-
HERALD, Feb. 12, 1971, at B1.
85. See supra note 5.
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District of Columbia, as required by section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, to ensure minority representation would not be harmed.
8 6
Furthermore, Democrats no longer controlled the process; the
Democratic legislature faced off against Republican Governor
Linwood Holton. 7
In the state legislature, the Senate adopted a plan to create
single-member districts that deviated in population within 5% of
the ideal.8" Liberal Democratic Senator Henry E. Howell from
Norfolk, who had failed as a gubernatorial candidate in 1969 and
was expected to run again in 1973, became the primary political
causality when he was drawn out of his district. 9 In the House,
the adopted plan's districts deviated from the ideal population by
9.6% and maintained multi-member districts ostensibly so that
districts could better meet the self-imposed goal of following polit-
ical boundaries.90
Two federal lawsuits emerged containing the new redistricting
plans. Delegate Clive L. DuVal alleged that the multi-member
House of Delegates plan robbed Northern Virginia of an addition-
al district, and he sought to institute single-member districts.9
Senator Howell alleged that the Senate plan shortchanged Nor-
folk of a district.92 These two lawsuits were consolidated, with
Howell as the lead plaintiff.93 The litigation on the House of Dele-
gates districts was delayed when the Department of Justice ob-
jected to the House of Delegates' plan, citing potential minority
representation retrogression among some multi-member dis-
tricts.94 The court postponed the primaries and put the state legis-
lature on notice: fix problems cited by the Department of Justice,
or the court would impose its own plan.9 Ultimately, the court
found both chambers' plans in violation of equal-population
86. See Dewar, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see S.B. 54, 1971 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1971).
89. Dewar, supra note 84.
90. Id.; see H.B. 63, 1971 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1971).
91. See Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138, 1139 (E.D. Va. 1971).
92. Id. at 1139.
93. Id. at 1138.
94. Section 5 Objections: Virginia, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/vot/sec_5/va obj2.php (last visisted Feb. 18, 2013); see Brief for the Appellant at
4-5, Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (No. 71-373); Helen Dewar, Va. Eyes U.S. Aid
on Districting, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, May 28, 1971, at C2.
95. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 94, at 5.
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standards and imposed its own plans.96 The court's House of Del-
egates plan created single-member districts and transferred a
district from Norfolk to Fairfax, while the Senate plan's only
change was to impose an at-large Norfolk district in place of sin-
gle-member districts.97
The U.S. Supreme Court initially refused to stay the court's or-
der,9 thereby forcing the 1971 elections to be held under the dis-
trict court's plans.99 However, the Supreme Court ultimately cre-
ated new precedent by reversing the lower court's decision and
reinstituting Virginia's newly enacted state legislative plans. '00
The Court found, for the first time, that reasonable population
deviations-here, 16.4%-were permitted to achieve other legiti-
mate state goals because the state's objective of preserving the in-
tegrity of political subdivision lines was not irrational.'01 Howev-
er, the Court upheld the lower court's at-large Norfolk Senate
district, finding against the legislature's plan to create a single-
member district for the at-sea sailors stationed at Norfolk's Naval
Station, many of whom were not Virginia residents. °2
Litigation also occurred over the congressional plan crafted by
a joint House and Senate committee.0 3 Wright County Democrat-
ic Chairman O'Wighton Simpson was lead plaintiff in a suit alleg-
ing improper population deviations in excess of 5.2%, although
the political motivation for the lawsuit was to undo an incumbent
pairing between Representative Watkins Abbitt and Representa-
tive W. "Dan" Daniel.0 4 After the Supreme Court of Virginia re-
fused to take action,' a federal court overturned the congres-
96. Howell, 330 F. Supp. at 1140.
97. Id. at 1145-46; High Court Asked to Stay Va. Redistricting Order, WASH. POST &
TIMES-HERALD, July 20, 1971, at C20.
98. Mahan v. Howell, 404 U.S. 1201, 1203 (1971).
99. Virginia Denied Stay of Districting Decision, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, July
28, 1971, at A17.
100. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329-30 (1973).
101. Id. at 319, 325-26.
102. Id. at 331-32; Helen Dewar, N. Virginia Loses One Assembly Seat," WASH. POST &
TIMES-HERALD, Feb. 22, 1973, at A7.
103. Simpson v. Mahan, 185 S.E.2d 47, 48 (Va. 1971) (per curiam).
104. Id.; Helen Dewar, Court Weighs Apportionment Suit, WASH. POST & TIMES-
HERALD, Oct. 8, 1971, at B2.
105. Simpson, 185 S.E.2d at 48; Helen Dewar, Court Rejects Challenge to Virginia Dis-
tricting: Va. Rejects Districting Challenge, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, Nov. 30, 1971, at
C1.
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sional plan.' °6 The legislature quickly moved to remedy the court's
objections, which included segregating the two incumbents, even
though Rep. Abbitt decided to retire."7 The new plan, approved by
the federal court, had population deviations of less than 1%.' o8
D. The 1980s: A Voting Rights Collision
The 1980s continued the urban and rural battles in the House
of Delegates, with Northern Virginia hoping to gain three seats in
the House of Delegates, partially due to continued population
growth and a perceived shortchange of one seat during the previ-
ous decade.' 9 The Senate, having better addressed malappor-
tionment previously, did not face as great a political challenge
with regards to population, but fell victim to voting rights is-
110
sues.
The Democratic-controlled General Assembly again squared off
against a Republican, Governor John Dalton. Governor Dalton
signed into law the legislature's plans, which were expected to fa-
vor Republicans because of population increases in Republican
suburban areas, although he predicted privately that the exceed-
ingly large population deviations would not withstand legal chal-
lenges.'' As he predicted, the plans were met with multiple legal
challenges related to population inequalities caused by imbalanc-
es among its multi-member districts apportioned to whole coun-
ties and cities."2 The ACLU, among others, filed a separate chal-
lenge claiming vote dilution."'3
The Department of Justice, in their review of the plans as re-
quired under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, found vote dilu-
tion in the creation of multi-member Senate districts in Norfolk,
106. Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1971); Va. Assembly Again
Tries Redistricting, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, Mar. 3, 1972, at C2.
107. Va. Assembly Again Tries Redistricting, supra note 106.
108. Va. Court Approves District Plan, WASH. POST & TIMES-HERALD, Mar. 15, 1972, at
A35.
109. Pat Bauer, N. Va. May Get Its Political Due, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1981, at Col.
110. Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350, 353 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1981); Patricia E. Bauer,
Challenge to Va. Reapportionment Plan Threatens to Delay November Elections, WASH.
POST, June 25, 1981, at B07.
111. Glenn Frankel & Pat Bauer, Remap Fiasco in Richmond: Special Session of Va.
Assembly Results in Chaos, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1981, at BO.
112. Cosner, 522 F. Supp. at 353; Bauer, supra note 110.
113. Cosner, 522 F. Supp. at 353; Bauer, supra note 110.
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where new census data enabled single-member districts, 1 4 and
found violations in six Tidewater House districts." The General
Assembly moved quickly to try to fix voting rights deficiencies
identified by the Department of Justice."6
Legal challenges to the House of Delegates' plan remained, and
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ultimately
ruled that the plan had constitutionally impermissible population
deviations." 7 The court ordered the November 1981 elections to be
held as scheduled but ordered new House of Delegates elections
to be held under a constitutionally acceptable redistricting plan
in November 1982.118 The Department of Justice objected to the
revised Senate plan for continued vote dilution in Norfolk, but no
Senate elections were scheduled for 1981.19
In the 1981 lame-duck session, the General Assembly again
adopted new state legislative plans that it hoped would satisfy
the courts and the Department of Justice.2 ° However, only the
Senate plan 2' satisfied Governor Dalton, who vetoed the House
plan.2 2 After failing to override the veto, the House of Delegates
tried again, only to face another veto.'23 A compromise was finally
hammered out in January of 1982, just before the legislative ses-
sion expired and a new legislature was seated. 124 The Department
of Justice approved the revised Senate plan, which created a
114. Section 5 Objections: Virginia, supra note 94; see Ed Bruske, Rebuff of Va. Redis-
tricting Was "Routine": White House Informed After Decision Made, WASH. POST, July 19,
1981, at BO.
115. Section 5 Objectives: Virginia, supra note 94; see Denis Collins, Va. Lobbies U.S.
on Remapping, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1981, at B05.
116. Denis Collins & Karlyn Barker, Assembly Approves Virginia Redistricting Despite
Filibuster, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1981, at BOL.
117. Cosner, 522 F. Supp. at 358; Patricia E. Bauer, Va. Republicans Hopeful of Gains
in Legislature, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1981, at BO.
118. Cosner, 522 F. Supp. at 364.
119. Virginia Redistricting Plan Rejected Again by Justice, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1981,
at Cl1; see Tyler Whitley, Legislators Hope Redistricting Will Be Less Agonizing This
Time, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 11, 1991, at Metro 1.
120. Dennis Collins & Patricia E. Bauer, Remap Plan Reached, WASH. POST, Nov. 25,
1981, at BOl.
121. S.B. 1, 1981 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 1981).
122. Denis Collins, Va. Redistricting Plan Vetoed by Gov. Dalton, WASH. POST, Dec. 1,
1981, at CO.
123. Glenn Frankel & Denis Collins, Latest Redistricting Plan Rejected by Gov. Dalton,
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1981, at CO.
124. H.B. 13, 1981 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 1981); see Denis Collins & Celestine
Bohlen, Redistricting Unresolved In Virginia: '81 Assembly Will Meet Today on Compro-
mise, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1982, at CO.
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black-plurality Norfolk district,12 but rejected the revised House
of Delegates' plan.'26 The legislature enacted a sixth redistricting
plan that acceded to the Department of Justice demands while al-
so creating single-member districts."7 This plan was finally ap-
proved by the Department of Justice,"8 and the ACLU dropped its
legal challenge.
The Democratic General Assembly and Governor Dalton also
battled over congressional redistricting. However, the General
Assembly's plan generally preserved the status quo and thus
proved less acrimonious."' Still, Governor Dalton vetoed the con-
gressional plan with amendments, seeking to protect Republican
Rep. Sanford Parris from the Democrats' efforts to carve Republi-
cans from his over-populated district."' With so little at stake,
and his legislative allies in opposition because other Republican
congressional members were protected, Governor Dalton dropped
his objections and approved the Democratic congressional plan
with minor revisions to further balance populations."' The De-
partment of Justice approved the congressional plan. 3'
E. The 1990s: Democrats Struggle to Retain Power
The legislature would again wrestle with population growth in
the 1990s; growth had clearly shifted to the Republican suburbs
while urban centers had stagnated, affecting both the House and
Senate districts."' General Assembly Democrats were in a better
position, politically, with a nominal ally in the governor's office,
125. U.S. Approves Va. Plan To Redistrict Senate, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1982, at B07.
126. Martin Weil & Patricia E. Bauer, U.S. Turns Down 5th Va. Remap, WASH. POST,
Mar. 13, 1982, at B01; Section 5 Objections: Virginia, supra note 94.
127. Michael Isikoff, Redistricting Plan for Va. Is Approved, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
1982, at B01; see H.B. 1, 1982 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 1982).
128. Isikoff, supra note 127.
129. Cf. Michael Isikoff, Virginia to Pay Groups That Blocked Districting, WASH. POST,
July 3, 1982, at D03 (discussing the settlements Virginia paid to the ACLU for legal fees
incurred when the organization opposed the state's plans).
130. Donald P. Baker & Pat Bauer, Remap Plan Accord Near in Virginia: Minor Varia-
tions In Present N. Va. Districts Accepted, WASH. POST, May 1, 1981, at BO.
131. Dalton Seeks District Changes, WASH. POST, May 16, 1981, at D06.
132. Patricia E. Bauer, Va. Senate Kills Dalton Remap Plan: Democrats Portray Defeat
as Setback for the Governor, WASH. POST, June 9, 1981, at C01.
133. See Collins & Bohlen, supra note 124.
134. See Donald P. Baker, Va. Suburbs May Gain Two New Senate Seats, WASH. POST,
Mar. 19, 1991, at B01.
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Democrat Douglas Wilder.'35 However, they were waging a hold-
ing action that required creative pairings of Republican incum-
bents in order to retain control of the General Assembly in the
face of the ongoing political realignment toward Republicans in
Virginia and other southern states.'36 The General Assembly's
plans met with opposition for failing to achieve greater racial rep-
resentation for African Americans from Republicans, minority
groups, and Governor Wilder.'37 Governor Wilder signed the
House plan,'38 but vetoed the Senate plan.'39 The Senate passed a
new plan that punished two foes of integration by creating an ad-
ditional African American majority Senate district at the expense
of Democratic Senator Howard Anderson and by shifting North-
ern Virginia Democratic Senator Joseph Gartlan's seat into the
Republican-friendly Shenandoah Valley. 4°  Governor Wilder
signed the new Senate plan,4' but the politics did not sit well
with Northern Virginia Democrats, and Governor Wilder eventu-
ally compromised on a revised Senate plan that restored the lost
representation to Northern Virginia.'4 The House of Delegates al-
so revised their plan after civil rights groups urged the Depart-
ment of Justice to reject the House of Delegates' original plan for
failing to create a twelfth African American minority district.
4 3
Bowing to pressure, the House of Delegates passed a revised plan
that met the minority groups' demands.4  With demonstrable in-
creases in minority representation, the Department of Justice ap-
135. See Donald P. Baker & John F. Harris, Wilder's First Year Marked by New Look,
Old Moves, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1991, at B01.
136. Donald P. Baker & John F. Harris, Angered Va. Republicans to Offer Redistricting
Plan, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1991, at D04; John F. Harris & Donald P. Baker, Blacks, GOP
Decry Va. House Redistricting Plan, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1991, at C07; John F. Harris,
New Lines Underscore Old Split: Southwest Dreads Va. Redistricting, WASH. POST, Mar.
31, 1991, at CO.
137. Donald P. Baker, Wilder Blasts Plan for Senate Districts, WASH. POST, Apr. 10,
1991, at D01.
138. H.B. 3001, 1991 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. I (Va. 1991).
139. John H. Harris, Wilder Vetoes Redistricting Plan as Insufficient, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 1991, at C01; see S.B. 1501, 1991 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. I (Va. 1991).
140. John F. Harris, Credit Me, Blame Gartlan for Lost Seat, Wilder Says: N. Va. Snub
Pure Politics, Governor Admits, WASH. POST, May 2, 1991, at CO.
141. John W. Anderson, Va. Senate Redistricting Approved: Plan Gives North 10 Seats,
Up From 8, WASH. POST, May 22, 1991, at C01.
142. Id.; see S.B. 1510, 1991 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. I (Va. 1991).
143. John F. Harris, Va. Assembly Approves New Redistricting Plan; Legislators Add
12th Majority-Black District, WASH. POST, July 20, 1991, at B01.
144. See H.B. 3016, 1991 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. I (Va. 1991).
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proved the legislative plans.145 Republicans sought relief from the
federal courts; in the absence of Voting Rights Act or excessive
population deviation violations, they claimed the House of Dele-
gates' plan was an impermissible partisan gerrymander by virtue
of excessive Republican incumbent pairings.'46 The court refused
to issue a preliminary injunction staying the implementation of
the plan for the upcoming elections, particularly because the af-
fected two incumbents "were able to move and run as incumbents
[and] have suffered no irreparable harm," outside of the burden of
moving."7 Despite their concerns, Republicans made significant
gains in the elections held under the new plans."4 Perhaps due to
their electoral gains, they sought no further court action.
The Democrats, anticipating that their position would be
weakened as soon as the new legislature was seated, convened a
special session following the November elections to address fed-
eral congressional redistricting. 9 The session devolved into with-
in-party urban-rural factionalism as Democrats debated the crea-
tion of a new seat in Northern Virginia. 5 ' Governor Wilder vetoed
the plan with amendments, keeping intact the Northern Virginia
district, while adding additional African American population to
the newly fashioned Third Congressional District, a change also
sought by the ACLU and NAACP. 1' The General Assembly ap-
proved Governor Wilder's amendments,"2 and the Department of
Justice approved the plan.5 3 Later, in 1997, a federal court found
that the Third Congressional District was a racial gerrymander
145. John F. Harris, U.S. Backs Revamped Va. Districts: 12 House Seats Represent Ma-
jority-Black Areas, WASH. POST, July 24, 1991, at C01.
146. Id.; see Republican Party of Va. v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400, 401-02 (W.D. Va.
1991).
147. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. at 407; John F. Harris, Va. GOP Sues Over Democrats' Plan
for Districts, WASH. POST, June 19, 1991, at C04.
148. John F. Harris, GOP Gains 8 Seats, Makes It a 2-Party Senate, WASH. POST, Nov.
6, 1991, at A27.
149. John F. Harris, Northern Va.'s Strength on the Line: Special Legislative Session
Takes Up New Congressional District, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1991, at E06.
150. Id.
151. John F. Harris, Wilder Draws Praise in Redrawing Congressional Map: Governor's
Proposals Increase Black Majority in New District, Leave N. Va. Largely Intact, WASH.
POST, Dec. 3, 1991, at D03.
152. John F. Harris, Assembly Approves Va. Remap: 2 Republicans Put In Same Dis-
trict, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1991, at E06.
153. Around the Region: Justice Department Approves Va. Congressional Redistricting,
WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1992, at D03.
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that did not serve a compelling state interest.' In 1998, the state
set about the task of redistricting, but addressed narrow deficien-
cies identified by the court by reuniting localities split by the dis-
trict; the Department of Justice approved the changes. 5
F. The 2000s: Republicans in Driver's Seat
By the time the next decade rolled around, the Republicans
controlled the General Assembly and for the first time in the
modern era, with an ally in Republican Governor James Gilmore
III, controlled Virginia's redistricting. Litigation began even be-
fore new census population data were released, with Republicans
arguing in federal court that they were not required to use statis-
tically adjusted census data."' The court ruled that the lawsuit
was not ripe"-a prescient decision, given that President Bush's
Census Bureau declined to make a statistical adjustment."8 The
population gains revealed by the census were realized in subur-
ban Republican strongholds,"' which meant that Republicans had
few difficult choices to make. The Democrats complained that the
unfair state legislative plans paired their incumbents, although
they had done the same to the Republicans a decade ago. 6° The
Department of Justice precleared both plans. 6' The Democrats
were left only with legal recourse and alleged state constitutional
violations of compactness and contiguity as well as novel argu-
ments regarding state racial provisions.'62 The state circuit court
found favorably for the plaintiffs.'63 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Virginia found that the plaintiffs had standing only for
154. Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1997).
155. Mary Spain, Virginia Redistricting Cases: the 1990s, MINN. SENATE, http://www.
senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redistlredsum/vasum.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2013); see S.B. 13, 1998 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1998).
156. Virginia v. Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d 46, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2000).
157. Id. at 54.
158. D'vera Cohn, Bureau Opposes Adjusting Census; Officials Say Count May Be More
Precise, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2001, at A01; August Gribbin, 'Adjusting' Won't Be Done on
Census; Democrats Decry Move on Redrawing, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at Al.
159. See Mary M. Kent et al., First Glimpses from the 2000 U.S. Census, 56
POPULATION BULL. 1, 28 (2001).
160. R.H. Melton, General Assembly Completes Work On Redistricting; GOP Unable to
Produce Budget Accord, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2001, at B05; see supra Section II.E.
161. Justin Levitt, Virginia, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edul
states-VA.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
162. Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 104 (Va. 2002).
163. See id. at 105.
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the districts in which they resided or those in which they could
establish a particularized injury, and vacated the trial court's
judgment with regard to any other challenged district.' For
those districts which did confer standing, the court found "the va-
lidity of the legislature's reconciliation of various criteria is fairly
debatable and not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwar-
ranted." 5 The court also dismissed a novel claim asserting that
article 1, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution prohibits racial
gerrymandering because "the right to be free from any govern-
mental discrimination upon the basis of ... race . . . shall not be
abridged."'66 The court agreed that the Virginia Constitution was
congruent with the United States Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment, but following federal precedent, 167 the court ruled
that race was a factor but not the predominant factor in the craft-
ing of the districts, and thus strict scrutiny need not be applied. 6 '
The Republicans' congressional plan predictably sought to pro-
tect Republican incumbents and was swiftly enacted into law.'69
The plan shifted African Americans from the Fourth Congres-
sional District to the majority-African American Third Congres-
sional District,7 ' a decision that would become a flashpoint be-
tween the two parties a decade later. 7' The Department of Justice
approved the plan, finding no retrogression of minority represen-
tation.' Nonetheless, the population shift was used by the Demo-
crats as the basis for litigation in Hall v. Virginia, alleging vote
164. Id. at 107.
165. Id. at 108, 110-11. The court found the General Assembly considered such criteria
as "population equality, incumbency, maintaining communities of interest, and avoiding
retrogression.. " Id. at 110.
166. Id. at 111-19 (alterations in original) (quoting VA. CONST. art. I, § 11).
167. Id. at 111 (discussing Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2001) (holding
that an improper use of race occurs when race is not merely a factor in the design of the
district but is the predominant factor)).
168. Id. at 118 ("We conclude that this record does not support the trial court's conclu-
sion that being black was the predominant factor in being chosen as part of a population
making up the majority-minority districts. As stated above, the use of race as a factor in
designing these districts is conceded. This record shows that along with race, accommoda-
tions for population equality, incumbency, and political party voting patterns were made
by the General Assembly." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. Metro; In Brief, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2001, at B03; see H.B. 18, 2001 Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001).
170. Metro; In Brief, supra note 169.
171. See supra Section II.G.
172. Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 424 n.1 (4th Cir. 2004).
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dilution through packing. 173 On appeal, a federal court ruled that
the African American voters failed to state a vote dilution claim
because they could not "form a majority in a single-member dis-
trict," thus allowing the plan to take effect.
7 4
G. The 2010s: Politics Trumps Reform
With the uncertainty of divided government looming for the
2010 redistricting, political leaders from both parties, including
Democratic Governor Tim Kaine and Republican Lieutenant
Governor Bill Bolling, endorsed redistricting reform. 75 A bill to
create a bipartisan commission unanimously passed in the Sen-
ate, only to die in a subcommittee of the House Privileges and
Elections Committee. 76 Gubernatorial candidate Bob McDonnell
also joined the reform bandwagon, pledging in 2009 that, if elect-
ed, he would create a commission to "ensure bipartisan citizen in-
volvement in the state legislative and congressional redistricting
process. '
When it appeared later that Governor McDonnell would renege
on his campaign promise,178 a group of moderate Republican do-
nors approached Quentin Kidd at Christopher Newport Universi-
ty and Michael McDonald at George Mason University-also one
of the authors-seeking a way forward on redistricting reform.
Out of these conversations, the idea for a redistricting competi-
tion among Virginia's college students was conceived. 9 The goal
of the competition was to educate students and the public about
redistricting alternatives by having students draw redistricting
plans divorced from the political process."8 This competition
173. Id. at 424-25.
174. Id. at 432.
175. See Tyler Whitley, Nonpartisan Redistricting Plan Defeated: House Panel Republi-
cans' Vote Draws Scorn of Kaine, Businesspeople and Activists, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Feb. 16, 2008, at Al.
176. Bob Lewis, Subcommittee Kills Nonpartisan Redistricting, ASSOCIATED PRESS ST.
& Loc. WIRE, Feb. 17, 2009.
177. Government Reform, GOV. BOB McDONNELL: OPPORTUNITY VA., http://www.
bobmcdonnell.com/index.php/issues/governmentreform (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
178. See Jeff Schapiro, Drawing Lines--and Blood, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 22,
2010, at BOl.
179. Brian McNeill, Va. College Students to Attempt Redistricting, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ST. & Loc. WIRE, Dec. 27, 2010.
180. Id.
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marked the first time in American history that such a competi-
tion was held while a state's redistricting process was underway,
and the first to generate a legal plan."'
Technology was a key enabler for the competition. In particu-
lar, the competition was made feasible by the existence of open-
source software specially designed for participative redistricting.
Changes in information and communication technology are creat-
ing substantial impacts across the study and practice of politics,182
but up to this point the substantive impact of technology on redis-
tricting had been minimal. Although geographic information sys-
tems ("GIS") software and commercial redistricting software have
been used routinely by professionals since 1990, and many states,
including Virginia, have made redistricting data publicly availa-
ble online since 2000, these innovations have had little effect on
participation or outcomes.8 ' At the beginning of the most recent
redistricting cycle, however, we identified the importance of cre-
ating an open-source tool to support publication in redistricting
and had software development well underway by the time the
competition was developed.'84 Therefore, when the competition
was contemplated, software was available that students and the
public could readily use.
Once the competition was organized, Governor McDonnell
moved forward on his campaign promise by issuing an executive
order establishing the IBARC,'85 charged with making mapping
recommendations to the legislature. The eleven-member commis-
sion comprised five Democrats, five Republicans, and a chair with
no party affiliation.8 6 The commission was tasked with drawing
181. Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, Technology for Public Participation in Re-
districting, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 247, 258 (Gary
Moncrief ed., 2011). An Ohio reform group and the Democratic Ohio Secretary of State
held a redistricting competition in 2009, using outdated 2000 census data.
182. See Micah Altman & Gary M. Klass, Current Research in Voting, Elections, and
Technology, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 269, 270 (2005).
183. See generally Micah Altman, Karin MacDonald, & Michael McDonald, From Cray-
ons to Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER
REV. 334, 336 (2005) (describing the use of GIS and commercial redistricting software by
redistricting authorities in the past two decades).
184. Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, The Dawn of Do.It.Yourself Redistricting?
Online Software Puts Redistricting Tools in the Hands of the Public, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, Jan. 2011, at 38, 40, 42, available at http://www.box.net/shared/ups8bqa46hk
he7ezckdq.
185. Exec. Order No. 31 (2011) (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.governor.virgin
ia.gov/PolicyOffice/ExecutiveOrders/viewEO.cfm?eo=31&pdf.
186. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Va., Governor Establishes Independent
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plans that were to be contiguous, comply with the Voting Rights
Act, be equal in population, preserve existing political bounda-
ries, and preserve communities of interest.'87
The Washington Post editorial board called the commission
"toothless."'88 The commission was created by executive order on
January 10, 2011, a scant two months before maps needed to be
presented to the legislature; would serve only in an advisory role;
and was to be funded by charitable donations. "' The technical, le-
gal, and organizational challenges were considerable. A knowl-
edgeable redistricting expert might have concluded that the
IBARC was designed to fail, since organizing a commission alone
might take months, and even without restrictive time constraints,
redistricting is a difficult task. Fortunately, the commission was
able to leverage the competition infrastructure in support of its
work. The governor's office asked Dr. McDonald to be an advisor
to the commission, with the responsibility of drawing redistrict-
ing plans. The student competition winning criteria were modi-
fied so that they could be used to create alternative plans. As a
byproduct of these developments, the IBARC became the first of-
ficial government entity to adopt the DistrictBuilder software.
The commission issued a report with their recommendations
which included proposed redistricting plans.9 ° The Washington
Post editorial board proved correct; Governor McDonnell disa-
vowed his commission, saying through a spokesman that he
would not use the commission's recommendations as political lev-
erage against the legislature.' Both chambers ignored the
IBARC's recommendations and the winning student competition
plans, even though legislators officially introduced some of these
plans as bills.'92 Instead, legislators in both chambers drafted
Bipartisan Redistricting Commission (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.governor.
virginia.gov/news/viewRelease.cfm?id=551.
187. Exec. Order No. 31, supra note 185.
188. Editorial, Mr. McDonnell's Toothless Commission, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2011/01/10/AR201101
1000124.html.
189. Exec. Order No. 31, supra note 185; Mr. McDonnell's Toothless Commission, supra
note 188.
190. INDEP. BIPARTISAN ADVISORY COMM'N ON REDISTRICTING, PUBLIC INTEREST IN
REDISTRICTING: A REPORT (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://redistrictingcommission.cnu.
edu/Final_RedistrictingCommission.Report.pdf [hereinafter IBARC REPORT].
191. Tyler Whitley, Virginia's Political Future/Plans for Redistricting May Be Present-
ed Tuesday, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 2011, at Metro 1.
192. Tyler Whitley, Congressional Map Up Next, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2011,
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their own plans. In the solidly Republican-controlled House of
Delegates, Democrats worked with Republicans to produce a bi-
partisan plan, while in the marginally Democratic-controlled
Senate, Democrats and Republicans introduced alternative plans
that would favor their respective parties.'93 On a party line vote,
the Senate adopted the Democratic alternative, and in a biparti-
san logroll, the two chambers sent both plans to the governor,
packaged together as House Bill 5001.' This maneuver prevent-
ed Governor McDonnell from selectively vetoing the Democratic
Senate plan. Instead, he vetoed the entire package but cited defi-
ciencies only in the Senate plan regarding compactness, respect
for local political boundaries, equal population, and a concern
that the plan was an excessive partisan gerrymander.19' The
at Metro 1; 2010 Redistricting Plans, VA. Div. LEGIS. SERVS., http://redistricting.dls.vir
ginia.gov/2010[RedistrictingPlans.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
193. Whitley, supra note 192.
194. H.B. 5001, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. I (Va. 2011).
195. Letter from Robert McDonnell, Governor of Va., to Va. House of Delegates (Apr.
15, 2001), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?112+amd+HB5001AG
("First, it is apparent that districts proposed in the Senate plan are not compact, as re-
quired in the Constitution of Virginia, and do not properly preserve locality lines and
communities of interest. These issues were noted in the Independent Bipartisan Advisory
Commission on Redistricting (Bipartisan Commission) report as the most significant con-
cerns of the citizens of Virginia. The Constitution of Virginia requires that electoral dis-
tricts be composed of compact territory. This requirement is also contained in the resolu-
tion adopted by the Senate Privileges and Elections Committee on March 25, 2011. Using
the most commonly recognized tools of compactness scoring, the Reock and Polsby-Popper
methods, the plan adopted by the Senate has less compact districts than the existing
House or Senate districts or other plans that have been proposed. The Senate Committee
resolution also requires that communities of interest be respected, including local jurisdic-
tion lines. While the House plan keeps the number of split localities relatively static, the
Senate plan significantly increases the number of times localities are split as compared to
either other proposed plans or the current redistricting law (from 190 to 198 in the House
plan (4% change), contrasted with an increase of 108 to 135 in the Senate plan (25%
change)). A plain visual examination of the districts in the Senate plan also places into
serious doubt that the compactness and communities of interest requirements have been
met... Second, I am concerned that the Senate plan may violate the one person-one vote
ideal embodied in the United States and Virginia Constitutions. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution provides for equal protection of the laws. This has
been interpreted to require that state legislative districts have as close to equal represen-
tation as practicable, taking into consideration other important and legitimate redistrict-
ing factors. Additionally, Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution of Virginia requires that
districts be drawn in a manner to give, as nearly as is practicable, representation in pro-
portion to the population of the district. The House plan has a deviation of only ± 1 per-
cent. However, in reviewing the districts proposed in the Senate plan, they appear to devi-
ate from the one person-one vote standard without any apparent legitimate justification.
While the deviation from the ideal district is smaller than in past decennial redistricting
cycles, deviations must be justified with achieving some recognized principle of redistrict-
ing such as preserving local jurisdictional lines, creating compact districts, or maintaining
communities of interest ... Lastly, I am concerned that the Senate plan is the kind of par-
2013]
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foundation for his argument was the competing partisan plans in-
troduced by Senate party leaders and not the alternative plans
from his commission.
196
The House and Senate made minor changes, repackaged their
plans into House Bill 5005, and dared the governor to veto again,
a move which would unravel the bipartisan legislative deal.
19 7
Governor McDonnell signed the revised plans into law,9' leading
some to question his nonpartisan redistricting pledge.'99 Unlike
past decades, the political parties had no appetite for litigating
the state legislative plans since both parties could be harmed.200
The Department of Justice approved the legislative plans.20'
While the General Assembly was able to reach a bipartisan
compromise to redistrict the two chambers controlled by different
political parties, it was unable to reach agreement on a congres-
sional plan. The sticking point was whether to protect all incum-
bents, giving the Republicans an 8-3 edge among the state's elev-
en districts, or to restore the African American population to the
Fourth Congressional District that had been shifted to the Third
Congressional District during the last redistricting, yielding a
Democratic-leaning Fourth Congressional District with 45% Afri-
can American voting-age population and reducing the Republi-
cans' edge to 7-4.2 After the November 2011 elections, when Re-
publicans gained a working majority in the Senate, the General
tisan gerrymandering that Virginians have asked that we leave in the past.... Certainly,
the Senate can create a plan that will be supported by a bipartisan majority of Senators,
especially with the Senate's overwhelming support for a bipartisan redistricting process as
expressed in previous legislation.").
196. Id.
197. H.B. 5005, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. I (Va. 2011).
198. Rosalind S. Helderman & Anita Kumar, Redistricting Deal in Virginia, WASH.
POST, Apr. 29, 2011, at B05.
199. See Warren Fiske, Governor Compromised on Redistricting Promise, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Sept. 19, 2011, at Metro 1.
200. See Helderman & Kumar, supra note 198.
201. Letter from Thomas Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., to E.
Duncan Getchell, Jr., Solicitor Gen., Va. (Jun. 17, 2011), available at http://redistricting.
dls.virginia.gov/2010/Data/Ref/DOJSubmission2Ol 1/Preclearanceletter.pdf.
202. Mac McLean, Discord over New Congressional Map, DAILY PRESS, June 11, 2011,
at A12; Bob Lewis, House, Senate Return to Renew US House Remap Talks,
REALCLEARPOLITICS (June 9, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/news/ap/politics/20
11/JunJ09/housesenatereturn to-renew ushouse remap-.talks.html.
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Assembly passed the congressional plan that protected all incum-
bents including the eight Republicans. °3 The Department of Jus-
tice approved the plan.
20 4
Democrats challenged the congressional plan in court, on the
basis of a novel argument: The Constitution of Virginia was
amended in 2004 to clarify continuity of representation of sena-
tors elected on staggered terms following redistricting."' A new
paragraph required that the decennial reapportionment "shall be
implemented for the November general election . . .that is held
immediately prior to the expiration of the term being served in
the year that the reapportionment law is required to be enact-
ed." 6 Democrats argued that the 2004 constitutional revision al-
lowed only the previous legislature to draw districts for the 2012
congressional election. 2" The argument potentially had merit;
other states' courts had found similar wording in their state con-
stitutions provided their legislatures with only one bite at the ap-
ple. 20 ' However, the Virginia circuit court found that while the use
of "shall" in reference to governmental action spoke in "mandato-
ry, not directory, terms," this mandate did not prohibit the legis-
lature from enacting a plan in 2012 despite its failure to do so in
2011; the court thus allowed the congressional plan to be used in
the 2012 election.209 While the Democrats declined to appeal the
court's decision, similar litigation may ensue if the government
enacts another redistricting plan, perhaps of the state Senate,
and the Supreme Court of Virginia may have the final word on an
appeal. 210
203. H.B. 251, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012).
204. Letter from Thomas Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., to E.
Duncan Getchell, Jr., Solicitor Gen., Va. (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://redistricting.
dls.virginia.gov/2010/Data/Ref/preclearance_letters.pdf.
205. Little v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, No. CL11-5253 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 27, 2012) (dis-
cussing VA. CONST. art. II, § 6).
206. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
207. Little, No. CL1l-5253, slip op. at 6.
208. Levitt & McDonald, supra note 4, at 1284 (noting that courts in California and
Colorado interpreted their state constitutions to allow redistricting only once following
each census).
209. Little, No. CL11-5253, slip op. at 6, 10-12.
210. Our prediction was nearly put to the test while this manuscript was in the process
of being published. In a surprise move, Senate Republicans attached an entirely new Sen-
ate redistricting plan to a House bill making technical adjustments to the House districts.
The move would have been blocked by Senate Democrats, with the support from Republi-
can Lieutenant Governor Bolling, but Democratic Senator Henry Marsh was away attend-
ing President Barack Obama's inauguration. In a further twist, when the bill returned to
20131
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H. Summary
From the Commonwealth's inception, Virginia's redistricting
has been mired in politics, as is common in other states. The po-
litical battles have pitted urban and rural regions, Democrats and
Republicans, and whites and blacks, and were sometimes narrow-
ly targeted to punish specific politicians. The state constitution
historically favored respecting existing political boundaries such
as counties, cities, and towns. However, for most of its history,
Virginia did not apply a formula to automatically apportion rep-
resentation to governmental subunits. Thus, respect for existing
political boundaries was often in tension with population equali-
ty, a requirement found in the state's constitutions even prior to
the landmark U.S. Supreme Court equal-population cases of the
1960s.211 The battle lines were primarily drawn regionally, not
ideologically, at the beginning, pitting east versus west, and later
pitting rural versus urban areas.212 Even after the 1960s, and af-
ter the state constitution was revised in 1970 to remove respect
for political boundaries, the General Assembly would not quietly
accede to population equality, as malapportionment became a tool
for rural Democrats to retain power.213 As late as the 1980s, a
court invalided a House of Delegates plan for excessive popula-
the House for approval of the Senate's amendment, Republican Speaker William Howell
ruled the amendment out of order. We suspect that if given a future opportunity, Senate
Republicans will attempt to redistrict the Senate again. See Olympia Meola & Jim Nolan,
Howell Rules Against Bid For New Senate Districts, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 2013,
at Al; Press Release, Speaker William J. Howell on Senate Amendments to House Bill 259
(Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www.williamjhowell.org/125-statement-of-speaker-
william-j-howell-on-senate-amendments-to-house-bill-259.
This plan was located between the adopted plan and the alternative plan proposed by
Republicans during the normal redistricting process. This plan differed significantly from
the adopted plan by having an additional majority-minority seat, an additional competi-
tive seat, fewer county splits, and was somewhat more compact, but had far less partisan
balance. Compared to the alternative plan put forth by Republicans, it also had one addi-
tional majority minority-district, an additional competitive seat, more county splits, was
somewhat less compact, and had slightly less partisan balance. Compare H.B. 5005, 2011
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011) (adopted plan), and Senate Plan: SB# J Watkins, VA.
Div. LEGIS. SERVS., http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/RedistrictingPlans.aspx#6
(last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (Republican-proposed alternative plan), with H.B. 259, 2013
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (proposed plan). Although this plan is not included in
the main tables and figures, its inclusion would not change any of our substantive conclu-
sions. A scatterplot including this plan is included in this article for reference. See infra
Figure 4.
211. See supra notes 36-37, 49, and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 20, 68-69, and accompanying text.
213. See supra Section II.C.
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tion deviations.214 Furthermore, following the 1960s, the state
wrestled with federal voting rights requirements, with the De-
partment of Justice and the courts forcing the state to amend
plans as late as the 1990s;"25 minority representation was even a
sticking point in the negotiations over the congressional plan in
the 20 10s.
216
Litigation over redistricting criteria subsided by the 2010s.
While politicians may have learned to avoid using population de-
viations or voting rights violations to achieve political goals, it
may also be that the unusual situation of a politically divided
General Assembly brought the parties together in a scenario of
mutually assured destruction-if either violated the legal cease-
fire by attacking the others' legislative plans, both would suffer.
That ceasefire was fragile, as evidenced by the Democrats' will-
ingness to litigate the Republican congressional redistricting that
passed in 2012 once Republicans gained functional unified control
of the state government in 2011.217 However, the Democrats' reli-
ance on a novel claim in their litigation was another sign that the
battles over population equality and voting rights have receded
into the past.218
III. ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE CURRENT STATE LEGISLATIVE AND
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING PLANS
Virginia's redistricting provisions have been reformed surpris-
ingly often, seen in the changes to the redistricting process and
requirements found in the 1830, 1851, 1864, 1870, and 1970 con-
stitutions.219 Reform recently returned as an issue in Virginia pol-
itics, although it has fallen short of meaningful implementation.
The Virginia Senate unanimously passed a reform bill in 2009,
only to see it die in a house sub-committee. 2 ' Governor McDon-
nell's attempt to highlight reform with his 2011 IBARC was as
214. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Section II.E.
216. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 203, 205, and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Section II.
220. S.B. 926, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2009); Tyler Whitley, Redistricting
Commission Rejected; GOP Members of House Panel Spurn Voting Measures, Too, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 2009, at AS.
2013]
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ineffective as Governor Almond's 1961 commission.' The legisla-
ture ignored both commissions' recommendation; perhaps the on-
ly substantial difference was that Governor Almond did not per-
sonally disavow his commission's recommendations-he left the
task to his successor.222
A major innovation during the most recent Virginia redistrict-
ing, catalyzed by information, communication, and technology,
was the generation of many more legal plans. In addition to the
adopted plans, legal plans were created by the IBARC and
through a first-of-its-kind student competition.22 A total of fifty-
six congressional, state, and House of Delegates plans were creat-
ed during the recent redistricting. The legislature considered four
congressional plans, nine Senate plans, and eight House of Dele-
gates plans during the legislative process that were substantively
different from one another and not simply plans that seemed to
have been shuffled around from one bill to another during the leg-
islative process. 22' The IBARC adopted three congressional, two
Senate, and two House of Delegates plans.25 Fifteen student
teams comprised of 150 students submitted a total of thirteen
congressional plans, nine Senate plans, and six House of Dele-
gates plans that met the minimal legal requirements. 226 All teams
submitted at least one plan, but only three teams submitted plans
for all six possible entries: one for each legislative body and the
congressional districts in the original student competition and
IBARC criteria categories.
221. See supra notes 63-71, 185-92, and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 70-71, 191-92, and accompanying text.
223. IBARC REPORT, supra note 190, at 10, 22.
224. See 2010 Redistricting Plans, supra note 192.
225. IBARC REPORT, supra note 190, at 23-42.
226. Id. at 10-11. Student teams submitted a total of fifty-five plans for judging in a
competition, but some of these were disqualified. Virginia Redistricting Competition Re-
sults, VA. REDISTRICTING COMPETITION, https://sites.google.com/a/varedistrictingcompeti
tion.org/public/results (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). Congressional plans had to have a popu-
lation deviation between the largest and smallest district not exceeding one percentage
point (although we also included an additional plan with a larger deviation) and had to
have at least one majority-minority congressional district. See Procedures & Rules, VA.
REDISTRICTING COMPETITION, https://sites.google.com/a/varedistrictingcompetition.org/pu
blic/ (follow "Competition Procedures and Rules" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 18, 2013)
(additional judging criteria on file with author). Senate and House plans had to have at
least a ten percentage point deviation. Id. The Senate plans needed at least five majority-
minority districts, and House plans had to have at least eleven. Id.
227. See Virginia Redistricting Competition Results, supra note 226.
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These plans can be evaluated by commonly used measures of
individual districts and overall redistricting plans, such as ad-
ministrative measures of population equality, compactness, re-
spect for local political boundaries, and representational
measures such as voting rights, partisan balance, and political
competitiveness."' Population equality and compactness are con-
stitutional requirements: both the federal and Virginia constitu-
tions require the former while only the Virginia Constitution re-
quires the latter.9 The Virginia constitutions prior to 1970
required respect for local political boundaries, and this persists as
a norm within Virginia politics as a widely recognized traditional
redistricting principle favored by courts and reformers.2 30 The
United States Constitution-as well as a congruent provision in
the Virginia Constitution-requires racial fairness.231 Although
the federal and Virginia constitutions do not require partisan
balance or political competitiveness,"' these measures are im-
portant to understand gerrymandering effects, and some state
laws or constitutions regulate such political outcomes.2"' An addi-
tional relevant criterion for which we unfortunately have no reli-
able means to measure is respect for communities of interest,
loosely defined as communities that share some common social,
demographic, or economic interest. The federal and Virginia con-
stitutions do not require respect for communities of interest, but
228. See generally Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 109, 110 (Va. 2002) (discussing fac-
tors used in designing districts such as population equality, incumbency, avoiding retro-
gression, compactness, and preservation of existing districts).
229. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973) (citing Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
230. See, e.g., Wilkins, 571 S.E.2d at 113; supra Sections II.A-B.
231. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
232. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131 (1986) (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973)). While Davis found partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable,
see id., a plurality of the Court questioned that conclusion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 281 (2004), and the Court has never overturned a redistricting plan as an unconstitu-
tional partisan gerrymander. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399, 409-10 (2006).
233. Adam B. Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751,
783, 784 n. 125 (2004); Michael P. McDonald, Regulating Redistricting, 40 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 675, 675 (2007); see also Justin Levitt, Where Are the Lines Drawn?, ALL ABOUT
REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-state.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2013)
(discussing the few states which do address political outcomes during redistricting).
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some states' constitutions do,234 and federal courts have allowed
communities of interest to be factored into redistricting decision-
making."5
Adhering to administrative criteria alone may not prevent ger-
rymandering; as Justice White noted, "this politically mindless
approach may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly
gerrymandered results."'236 Any set of measures may carry a set of
second-order biases, such that adherence to ostensibly neutral
administrative criteria may produce a gerrymander affecting
electoral outcomes of partisan balance, competition, and racial
representation.237 For example, in the 2012 election, although Re-
publicans won more House of Representatives seats than did
Democrats, the sum of the votes for Democratic candidates ex-
ceeded that for Republican candidates.238 Some have claimed that
this is primarily a result of drawing districts that adhere to ad-
ministrative criteria and not a product of partisan Republican
gerrymandering, as Democratic voters are believed to be ineffi-
ciently concentrated in urban areas from a redistricting stand-
219point.
The many plans generated during the Virginia redistricting
process enable a rigorous evaluation of these claims as they apply
to Virginia's congressional and state legislative districts. We
measure the plans on the various criteria and plot the values,
thereby assessing the trade-offs among the various criteria.24 ° We
note that redistricting is such a complex mathematical problem
234. See Justin Levitt, Where the Lines Are Drawn-State Legislative Districts, ALL
ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-tablestate.php (last visited Feb.
18, 2013) (listing six states with constitutional requirements to preserve communities of
interest and noting that Virginia considers communities of interest in an advisory capaci-
ty); Justin Levitt, Where the Lines Are Drawn-Congressional Districts, ALL ABOUT
REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-tablefed.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2013)
(listing two states with constitutional requirements to preserve communities of interest
and noting that Virginia considers communities of interest in an advisory capacity).
235. See, e.g., Chen v. Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 515 (5th Cir. 2000).
236. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753 (1973).
237. Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated Redistricting, 42
J. STATISTICAL SOFTWARE, no. 4, June 2011, at 1, 12 (citing FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK
VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 (1990)).
238. Hendrik Hertzberg, Mandate with Destiny, NEW YORKER, Dec. 3, 2012, at 37, 37-
38.
239. Id. at 38; Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Politi-
cal Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, Q.J. OF POL. SCI. (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 2-3), available at http://www.personal.umich.edu/-jowei/florida.pdf.
240. Altman & McDonald, supra note 9, at 89.
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that we can never know if any plan is the optimal plan on one cri-
terion or all relevant criteria."' The observed trade-offs are thus
only illustrative and not definitive-and only apply to conditions
as they existed during the 2010 redistricting. However, the exist-
ence of a plan that, for example, is both compact and politically
fair, can disprove such statements that Republican electoral ad-
vantage is solely a function of following administrative criteria.
Furthermore, entities that generated plans during the Virginia
redistricting process may have explicitly respected some or all of
the criteria identified above. The legislature is formally bound on-
ly by state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.
The governor directed his commission not only to follow the ad-
ministrative measures we described above, but also to consider
voting rights and respect for communities of interest. 42 The or-
ganizers of the student redistricting competition awarded a cate-
gory of prizes to plans that were judged to best achieve the com-
243
mission's criteria, and a second category that additionally
balanced partisan fairness and competition criteria. 44
We begin our analysis by defining our measures, starting with
the administrative measures. Population equality refers to the
United States and Virginia constitutional requirements that the
districts must be nearly equal.245 We measure the population of
districts using the total population as reported by the 2010 Fed-
eral Census. 246 A district's population equality is typically meas-
241. Altman & McDonald, supra note 237, at 13-14.
242. Exec. Order No. 31, supra note 185.
243. See Virginia Redistricting Competition Results, supra note 226. The commission
judging criteria was added as a second award category when the Governor organized the
IBARC so that student-plans may inform the commission's work. Id. The second set of cri-
teria initially formed the only award category. Id.
244. Virginia Redistricting Competition, VA. REDISTRICTING COMPETITION, https:H
sites.google.com/a/varedistrictingcompetition.orgpublic (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). Win-
ners were announced at an awards ceremony held at the State Library in Richmond, host-
ed by the Virginia League of Women Voters. Virginia Redistricting Competition Concludes,
PUBLIC MAPPING PROJECT, https://sites.google.com/a/publicmapping.org/public/News/vir
giniaredistrictingcompetitionconcludes (last updated Mar. 23, 2011, 5:07 PM). Prize
amounts were awarded based on the difficulty of drawing the plans, which was a function
of the number of districts to be drawn. First place 100-seat House of Delegates plans re-
ceived $2000 and second place received $1000. First place forty-seat Senate plans received
$1500 and second place received $750. First place eleven-seat congressional plans received
$1000 and second place received $500. In sum, $13,500 in prize money was awarded. Vir-
ginia Redistricting Competition, supra.
245. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973) (citing Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
246. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: YOUR GUIDE TO 2010
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ured by calculating the percent deviation from the ideal-sized dis-
trict, which is calculated by dividing a jurisdiction's total popula-
tion by the number of districts in the legislative body. We then
score a plan on an overall measure of the difference of the popula-
tion deviation between the most over-populated district and the
most under-populated district. For the scatter plots, we rescale
this measure by subtracting it from one, so that larger numbers
indicate a greater degree of population equality.
247Compactness can be measured in various ways. Common
methods generally measure the length of the district's perimeter
or the area of the district and compare to an idealized shape, such
as the most compact shape, a circle. 248 The concept is that irregu-
larly shaped districts score lower on such mathematical
measures. 249 However, unless a state explicitly defines a compact-
ness measure, the courts have generally measured compactness
through visual inspection.250 We used the ratio of a district's pe-
rimeter to a circle's perimeter with the same area as the district.
This measure is commonly known as "Schwartzberg" compact-
ness, although the algorithm was invented by Cox, and the rank-
ings it yields are identical to other perimeter-to-area ratios, as
long as they are properly normalized.25' Each district is scored on
a scale of zero to one, with one being most compact.252 In the ta-
bles and scatter plots, plans are scored on the average compact-
ness of all districts, such that a greater number indicates a plan
with an overall greater degree of compactness.
"Respect for local political boundaries" is most commonly inter-
preted to mean that districts should not intersect fixed local polit-
REDISTRICTING DATA (July 2010), available at http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/StrengthIn
Numbers2010.pdf. Census redistricting data files are known as P.L. 94-171, for the public
law mandating their release. Id. at 2.
247. See Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compact-
ness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. OF POL. 1155,
1155-56 (1990); Micah Altman, Districting Principles and Democratic Representation 61-
62 (Mar. 31, 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, California Institute of Technology), availa-
ble at http://thesis.library.caltech.edu1871/.
248. Niemi et al., supra note 247, at 1158, 1163.
249. Id. at 1160.
250. See id. at 1156.
251. Id. at 1161 tbl.1. For a discussion of the Cox/Schwartzberg measure, see generally
Niemi et al., supra note 247.
252. This measure of compactness is common. See Niemi et al., supra note 247, at 1160;
see also Altman, supra note 247, at 60-113 (demonstrating the equivalence of the Cox/
Schwartzberg measure with other alternative measures).
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ical boundaries. For Virginia, we identify these as counties and
independent cities, which are explicitly designated in the census
data. We count the number of times these local jurisdictions are
split into districts. A local jurisdiction that is entirely contained
within a single district is not split, a locality split between two
districts is split twice, a locality split between three districts is
split thrice, and so on. We then sum the number of splits across
all counties and independent cities in jurisdictions to develop a
plan score. In the scatter plots, we rescale this measure by sub-
tracting it from zero, so that a higher number indicates a plan
with fewer splits.
Turning to the evaluation of representational measures, voting
rights requirements are difficult to measure. Typically, jurisdic-
tions hire experts to evaluate patterns of racially polarized voting
by racial and ethnic groups to determine the percentage of the
minority voting-age population necessary to elect a minority can-
didate of choice."' Patterns of racially polarized voting may vary
across a state or locality, so the exact percentage of the minority
voting-age population to elect a minority candidate of choice will
similarly vary. Lacking the resources to do a comprehensive eval-
uation of racially polarized voting, we implement a simple meas-
ure that a voting rights district must have at least a 50% African
American voting-age population.254 For the tables and scatter
plots, we then count the number of such so-called "minority-
majority" districts across the redistricting plan.
"Political balance" and "political competition" are two measures
constructed in a similar manner.255 The first step to calculate
253. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1986). While this landmark case
described a federal Voting Rights Action section 2 challenge, similar principles apply to
measuring racially polarized voting in Voting Rights Act section 5 litigation. See generally
GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM: RECONSTRUCTING
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM AGGREGATE DATA (1997) (reviewing statistical methods to
measure racially polarized voting).
254. Under a section 2 claim, plaintiffs must show the existence of at least a 50% mi-
nority voting-age population demonstration district. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 19-
20 (2009). However, to comply with section 5 non-retrogression of minority representation,
an effective minority district may have less than 50% minority voting-age population. Id.
at 24-25.
255. The methods have been used in academic, practical, and legal arenas. For the par-
tisan fairness measure, see DONALD E. STOKES, LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING BY THE NEW
JERSEY PLAN 11-17 (1993); Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Sym-
metry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION
L.J. 2, 10 (2007); J. Morgan Kousser, Estimating the Partisan Consequences of Redistrict-
ing Plans-Simply, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 521, 530 (1996) (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
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these measures is to determine the underlying partisan strength
for the Democratic and Republican parties in these districts.
Since the two major political parties are in all-but-rare instances
elected to office, votes for minor party candidates are removed
from the underlying partisan strength measure. We measure the
partisan support of districts using the two-party share of the 2008
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates' votes.8 6 We
shift the statewide two-party vote to roughly approximate a hypo-
thetical fifty-fifty election.
The next step is to calculate the partisan balance and competi-
tion measures. For the partisan balance measure, each district is
scored based on whether it has an underlying partisan strength
measure above or below 50%. Thus, the score indicates which
party is favored within a district. The number of districts leaning
toward one of the two parties is summed across all districts. Since
the statewide vote is shifted to simulate a hypothetical fifty-fifty
election, the deviation of the number of districts that lean toward
a party from 50% reveals the partisan bias of the plan. In the ta-
bles below, we report the number of districts with a Republican
majority. In the scatter plots below, we rescale this measure so it
represents half the number of total districts minus the number of
Republican leaning districts, such that greater negative numbers
indicate a greater number of Republican majority districts. We
rescale the measure this way because no plan had a majority of
Democratic-leaning districts, and thus a greater number indi-
cates a greater degree of partisan balance. For the eleven con-
gressional districts, the number of Republican leveling districts is
subtracted from 5.5; for the forty Senate districts, from twenty;
and for the one hundred House of Delegates districts from fifty.
Political competition starts with the same underlying partisan
strength measure used to measure partisan balance. Where par-
tisan balance only provides a direction of party support in a dis-
trict, political competition provides a measure of how closely con-
109, 132, 139 n.17 (1986)). For the political competition measure, see generally In re 2001
Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141 (Alaska 2002).
256. The student redistricting competition used the 2009 gubernatorial election to
evaluate partisan balance and competition. Precinct level election returns for the 2009
governor's election are highly correlated with other recent statewide elections (all correla-
tion coefficients greater than 0.95), including the 2008 presidential election. Although not
a component of this analysis, we are ultimately interested in comparing Virginia with oth-
er states, which requires a common metric, such as the national election for president.
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tested a district may be in a typical election minus any candidate
or campaign effects. We score a district as competitive if it has an
underlying partisan strength measure plus or minus five per-
centage points from 50%.257 In the tables below, we sum the num-
ber of competitive districts across all districts to calculate a plan
level measure of competition. In the scatter plots, we report the
same measure since a greater value indicates a greater level of
competition. In the scatter plots, we report the same measure
since a greater value indicates a greater level of competition.
We provide the metrics for each plan in Tables 1 through 3. We
identify the entity that created the plan-the legislature, the
IBARC, or the student team. We also identify if the plan was
adopted or vetoed, the principal Democratic or Republican legis-
lative alternative (if one existed), and, for the student teams, the
judging criteria-the original competition criteria established by
the competition organizers or a second set of judging criteria con-
sistent with the governor's commission criteria-a plan was sub-
mitted to and if a plan won first or second place. We also display
these plan statistics in a matrix of scatter plots, so that the plans
may be visually compared against one another on the various cri-
teria. In these plots, the legislative plans are identified with an
upward triangle, the commission plans with a circle, and the stu-
dent team plans with a downward triangle; we draw clouds
around similar types of plans so that they may generally be dis-
tinguished from one another. We also identify adopted ("A"), ve-
toed ("V"), and Democratic ("D") or Republican ("R") alternatives
to the adopted plans, if they exist. Sometimes labels unfortunate-
ly overlap when two plans are substantially similar on two crite-
ria.
257. A ten point range is often used by political scientists to identify a competitive elec-
tion. See, e.g., David R. Mayhew, Congressional Election: The Case of the Vanishing Mar-
ginals, 6 POLITY 295 (1974). For a discussion of a more precise measure of what consti-
tutes a competitive district, see Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting and Competitive
Districts, in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY 222 (Michael P. McDonald & John Sam-
ples eds., 2006).
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Pop. Black Avg. Corn- Rep.
Entity Plan Name Dev. Maj. pact Splits Lean Comp.
Legislature Adopted 2012 HB 251 0.0% 1 0.40 37 8 4
SB 455 Intro. - J.
Vogel 0.0% 1 0.40 37 8 4
SB 5004 - M. Locke
Dem. Sub. 0.0% 1 0.41 31 7 2
SB 5004 - M. Locke 0.0% 1 0.39 51 7 1
Mean 0.0% 1 0.40 39.00 7.50 2.75
Max 0.0% 1 0.41 51 8 4
Min 0.0% 1 0.39 31 7 1
Commission Option 1 0.0% 1 0.50 38 7 4
Option 2 0.0% 1 0.51 41 6 2
Option 3 0.0% 1 0.48 37 6 4
Mean 0.0% 1 0.50 38.67 6.33 3.33
Max 0.0% 1 0.51 41 7 4
Min 0.0% 1 0.48 37 6 2
Christopher New-
Students Comp port 0.7% 1 0.45 33 7 5
Christopher New-
Comm port 0.1% 1 0.53 32 7 4
Comp ODU 0.9% 1 0.53 34 7 5
Comp GMU 0.9% 1 0.43 58 7 5
Comp JMU Team 1 0.7% 1 0.44 74 7 5
Comp JMU Team 2 2.8% 1 0.51 56 7 3
Comm Univ. of Richmond 0.2% 1 0.44 32 6 5
Comp 1st
Place UVA Team 1 0.0% 1 0.47 63 6 3
Comm 2nd
Place UVA Team 1 0.0% 1 0.52 46 6 3
Comp 2nd
Place UVA Team 2 0.0% 1 0.51 47 6 3
Comm VCU 0.9% 1 0.47 53 7 6
Comm W&M Undergrad 0.7% 1 0.51 44 6 2
Comm 1st
Place W&M Law School 0.0% 1 0.50 41 6 2
Mean 0.6% 1 0.49 47.15 6.54 3.92
Max 2.8% 1 0.53 74 7 6
Min 0.0% 1 0.43 32 6 2
Table 1: Congressional Plan Statistics
Notes: Pop. Dev. = Population deviation between largest and smallest district, Black Maj. = Number of African-
American Majority Districts, Avg. Compact = Average compactness of all districts, Splits = Total number of
times county and independent cities split by districts, Rep. Lean = Number of Republican majority districts,
Comp. = Number of competitive districts. Plans are identified as produced by the Legislature, Commission, or
Students. Legislative plan names are derived from Division of Legislative Services Redistricting 2010 website,
http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov2010/. Substantially duplicate plans are removed, they are ordered roughly
in the steps taken during the legislative process, and are classified if they were the Adopted plan or the Dem.
(Democratic) alternative. Student plans are identified if they were submitted to the Comp (Competition) or
Comm (Commission) judging categories. The 1st Place and 2nd Place plans in each judging category are further
identified. Please see text for more information.
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Pop. Black Avg. Corn- Rep.
Entity Plan Name Dev. Maj. pact Splits Lean Comp.
HB 5005ICh. 1 enacted
Legislature Adopted 4/29/11 4.0% 5 0.40 124 21 8
HB 5005 Sen. Commit-
tee Sub. 4.0% 5 0.40 122 21 8
Vetoed HB 5001 Conf. Report 4.0% 5 0.39 135 21 6
HB 5001 Passed Sen. 4.0% 5 0.39 136 21 6
SB 5001 J.Howell
(4/3/11) 4.0% 5 0.40 123 21 6
SB# J. Howell (3/30/11) 4.0% 5 0.40 124 21 6
SB#J. Howell 4.0% 5 0.40 124 21 6
Watkins Committee
Rep. Sub. 0.9% 5 0.51 88 25 8
SB# J. Watkins 0.9% 5 0.51 88 25 8
Mean 3.3% 5 0.42 118.22 21.89 6.89
Max 4.0% 5 0.51 136 25 8
Min 0.9% 5 0.39 88 21 6
Commission 2% Deviation Option 3.8% 5 0.53 72 23 8
3% Deviation Option 7.0% 5 0.54 59 24 8
Mean 5.4% 5 0.54 65.50 23.50 8.00
Max 7.0% 5 0.54 72 24 8
Min 3.8% 5 0.53 59 23 8
Students Comm Mary Washington 9.7% 5 0.61 137 23 9
Comm Univ. of Richmond 7.3% 5 0.52 101 24 11
Comp UVA Team 1 0.1% 6 0.48 190 22 8
Comm 2nd
Place UVA Team 1 2.3% 6 0.52 206 23 8
Comp 1st
Place UVA Team 2 2.0% 5 0.51 163 22 10
Comm UVA Team 2 0.8% 5 0.44 113 23 10
Comm 1st
Place W&M Undergrad 8.7% 5 0.57 76 22 10
Comp 2nd
Place W&M Law School 9.7% 5 0.59 68 23 11
Comp W&M Law School 9.2% 5 0.59 55 22 10
Mean 5.5% 5.22 0.54 123.22 22.67 9.67
Max 9.7% 6 0.61 206 24 11
Min 0.1% 5 0.44 55 22 8
Table 2: Senate Plan Statistics
Notes: Pop. Dev. = Population deviation between largest and smallest district. Black Maj. = Number of African-
American Majority Districts, Avg. Compact = Average compactness of all districts, Splits = Total number of
times county and independent cities split by districts, Rep. Lean = Number of Republican majority districts,
Comp. = Number of competitive districts. Plans are identified as produced by the Legislature, Commission, or
Students. Legislative plan names are derived from Division of Legislative Services Redistricting 2010 website,
http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/. Substantially duplicate plans are removed, they are ordered roughly
in the steps taken during the legislative process, and are classified if they were the Adopted plan, Vetoed plan
or the Rep. (Republican) alternative. Student plans are identified if they were submitted to the Comp (Competi-
tion) or Comm (Commission) judging categories. The 1st Place and 2nd Place plans in each judging category are
further identified. Please see text for more information.
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Pop. Black Avg. Corn- Rep.
Entity Plan Name Dev. Maj. pact Splits Lean Comp.
HB 5005/Ch.1 enacted
Legislature Adopted 4/29/11 2.0% 12 0.48 197 57 24
HB 5005 - C. Jones 2.0% 12 0.48 198 57 24
2012 HB259 -Passed
House 2.0% 12 0.48 197 57 24
2012 HB259 - Cole 2.0% 12 0.48 197 57 24
Vetoed HB 5001 - Conf. Report 2.0% 12 0.48 198 57 24
HB 5001 - Passed Sen. 2.0% 12 0.48 198 57 24
HB 5001 - Committee
Sub. 2.0% 12 0.48 197 57 24
HB 5001 - C. Jones 2.0% 12 0.49 197 57 24
Mean 2.0% 12 0.48 197.38 57.00 24.00
Max 2.0% 12 0.49 198 57 24
Min 2.0% 12 0.48 197 57 24
Commission 12 Minority Districts 4.0% 12 0.59 153 55 23
13 Minority Districts 4.0% 13 0.58 156 56 22
Mean 4.0% 12.50 0.59 154.50 55.50 22.50
Max 4.0% 13 0.59 156 56 23
Min 4.0% 12 0.58 153 55 22
Comp 1st
Students Place GMU 9.7% 12 0.54 168 56 24
Comp Longwood 9.9% 11 0.55 225 54 25
Comm 1st
Place Univ. of Richmond 9.8% 11 0.58 176 55 22
Comp 2nd
Place UVA Team 1 2.6% 11 0.59 272 55 31
Comm UVA Team 1 3.6% 11 0.59 268 55 30
Comm 2nd
Place UVA Team 2 1.4% 12 0.55 221 54 27
Mean 6.2% 11.33 0.57 221.67 54.83 26.50
Max 9.9% 12 0.59 272 56 31
Min 1.4% 11 0.54 168 54 22
Table 3: House of Delegates Plan Statistics
Notes: Pop. Dev. = Population deviation between largest and smallest district, Black Maj. = Number of African-
American Majority Districts, Avg. Compact = Average compactness of all districts. Splits = Total number of
times county and independent cities split by districts, Rep. Lean = Number of Republican majority districts,
Comp. = Number of competitive districts. Plans are identified as produced by the Legislature, Commission, or
Students. Legislative plan names are derived from Division of Legislative Services Redistricting 2010 website,
http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/. Substantially duplicate plans are removed, they are ordered roughly
in the steps taken during the legislative process, and are classified if they were the Adopted plan or the Vetoed
plan. Student plans are identified if they were submitted to the Comp (Competition) or Comm (Commission)
judging categories. The 1st Place and 2nd Place plans in each judging category are further identified. Please
see text for more information.
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Figure 3. House of Delegates
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The summary statistics in Tables 1 through 3
least three general patterns:
demonstrate at
First, students are quite capable of creating legal districting
plans. In each of the three legislative bodies, there were a sub-
stantial number of student contributions that met the legal re-
quirements. And in two of the three bodies, the number of legal
student submissions exceeded the number of plans created by ei-
ther house in the General Assembly.
Second, student plans generally demonstrated a wider range of
possibilities than the other entities. The range of scores across the
student plans was wider for each of the criteria examined, and for
A. General Patterns
-75 - .5 .4 .3 -2
P25s_
BA-nc
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every legislative body with the exceptions of the majority-
minority criterion, where student plans demonstrated a wider
range in the Senate, and a smaller range than the commission in
the House, and of county integrity, where student plans demon-
strated a smaller range in the House.
Third, the "best"plan, as ranked by each individual criterion,
was a student plan. Although no plan dominated all others in eve-
ry criterion, the top ranking plan in each single-criterion ranking
belonged to a student team.
Furthermore, the tables suggest additional general patterns:
Fourth, the student plans covered a larger set of possible
tradeoffs among each criterion. With the exception of the majori-
ty-minority criterion in the congressional body, students' plans
covered a greater amount of the two-dimensional space defined by
the pairs of criteria. This suggests that the student teams ex-
plored more substantive possibilities than the other entities.
Fifth, student plans were generally better on pairs of criteria.
For any convex weighting of criteria, there is a student plan that
beats all of the other plans-with the exceptions of pairs includ-
ing partisan balance in the Senate and pairs involving county in-
tegrity or majority-minority districts in the House.
Sixth, as discussed below in detail, student plans were more
competitive and had more partisan balance than any of the adopt-
ed plans.
B. Congress
We begin our analysis with redistricting plans for Virginia's
eleven congressional districts9 5 Recall that the Republican-
controlled House and Democrat-controlled Senate failed to reach
compromise in 2011.2,9 Republicans passed their favored plan in
2012 following the functional Republican takeover of the Senate
following the 2011 state elections.26 All legislative plans had one
majority-minority district, and thus likely would not retrogress
258. The discussion which follows in this section will reference Table 1, supra, and
Figure 1, supra.
259. See supra Section II.G.
260. See supra note 203 and accompanying text
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existing minority representation in Virginia's congressional dele-
gation. In the legislature, two competing plans emerged: one from
the Republicans, who favored a 8-3 partisan division of the state
that protected all incumbents, and one by the Democrats, with a
7-4 partisan division.2"' The partisan contention involved the
Fourth Congressional District, represented by Republican incum-
bent Randy Forbes.262 Democrats wished to fashion this district
into a roughly 45% African American district-sometimes called a
"minority-influence" district-that would likely elect a Democrat,
while Republicans wished to preserve the district's Republican
character.262 The legislative plans were similarly, if slightly less,
electorally competitive to all other plans, particularly among the
Democratic alternatives, which sacrificed electoral competition
for an additional safe Democratic seat. The legislature's plans
were among the most equal in population, which is expected be-
cause anything more than minimal population deviations invites
legal challenges.2 4 While the legislative plans tended to be less
compact than those produced by the IBARC or the students, a
proposal from Democratic Senator Mamie Locke was slightly
more compact than the adopted plan. The legislature's plans
tended to have minimal splits of local political boundaries, with
Senator Locke's proposal having only thirty-one splits-the few-
est among the plans analyzed. When compared to rival alterna-
tives offered by the legislative political parties, Senator Locke's
plan was more compact, split more local political boundaries, and
had a more even partisan balance than the adopted plan. The
adopted plan had more electoral competition, which was perhaps
a necessary consequence of spreading Republicans across south-
ern Virginia districts in order to produce more districts favoring
Republicans.265
The IBARC adopted three plans. Option 1 strictly followed the
commission's criteria, and reoriented the current majority-
minority Third Congressional District stretching from Virginia
Beach to Richmond along the southern border with North Caroli-
261. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
262. Lewis, supra note 202.
263. Id.
264. See generally supra Section II (discussing various lawsuits which resulted from
districts with population variances).
265. For a theoretical perspective, see Richard G. Niemi & John Deegan, Jr., A Theory
of Political Redistricting, 72 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 1304 (1978).
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na, thereby improving the compactness of that district and sur-
rounding districts;266 Option 2 retained the current configuration
of the Third Congressional District, while otherwise respecting
the mandated criteria;27 and Option 3 followed the governor's cri-
teria and further minimized incumbent pairing."' Like the legis-
lature's plans, all commission plans had one majority-minority
district and minimal population deviations. The commission's
plans were uniformly more compact than the most compact legis-
lative plan, and had a similar number of local boundary splits as
the adopted plan: one with exactly the same with thirty-seven,
one with thirty-eight, and one with forty-one. Two of the plans-
Options 2 and 3-have a partisan split of 6-5 favoring Republi-
cans while Option 1 has a Republican-favoring split of 7-4. Op-
tions 1 and 3 have four competitive districts and Option 2 has
two.
A vivid contrast exists between the adopted plan and a plan
drawn by a University of Virginia team of undergraduate stu-
dents.269 These two plans are similar in having nearly zero popu-
lation deviation between the largest and smallest district and
having one majority-minority district.' The student plan is the
more compact plan, and thus consistently appears on the right of
every plot in the column of compactness plots in Figure 1, while
the adopted plan is the least compact and appears on the left. The
plans also differ in that the adopted plan has the least partisan
balance among all plans, with an 8-3 partisan split favoring Re-
publicans,271 while the student plan ties as the most equally bal-
anced, with a partisan split of 6-5. The adopted plan fares better
than the student plan in terms of splits of counties and independ-
ent cities, with thirty-seven splits compared to forty-six from the
266. IBARC REPORT, supra note 190, at 23-24.
267. Id. at 25.
268. See id. at 26.
269. This plan won second place in the Student Redistricting Competition, in the gov-
ernor's commission award category. See supra Table 1.
270. The adopted plan has an absolute deviation of thirty-eight persons between the
smallest and largest district while the student plan has an absolute deviation of twenty-
three persons.
271. As described above, partisanship is the normalized 2008 presidential election
votes excluding votes for minor party candidates. See supra note 256 and accompanying
text.
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student plan. The adopted plan is also more electorally competi-
tive, with four competitive districts compared with three for the
student plan.
Although there were many more student plans drawn, the thir-
teen student plans accepted for judging all had one minority-
majority district. All but one had a population deviation of less
than 1%, with several with minimal deviations near or at one
person. In comparison to the legislative plans, the student plans
were uniformly more compact. The student plans were on average
about as compact as the commission's plans, but exhibited greater
variability. Four of the student plans had fewer splits of local po-
litical boundaries than the adopted plan's thirty-seven; teams
from Christopher Newport University and the University of
Richmond both had thirty-two splits. The plan with the least
number of local political boundary splits was the legislative plan
produced by the Democrats. Similar to the legislature, the
IBARC's plans generally had fewer splits than many of the stu-
dent plans. The student plans were more equally balanced than
the adopted plan's 8-3 Republican split, many with either a 6-5
split or a 7-4 split, similar to the IBARC's plans. A team from
Virginia Commonwealth University created a plan with the most
competitive districts of any plan, with six districts; this plan also
had a 7-4 Republican split. While this plan was more compact
than all legislative plans and all but one of the commission plans,
it had a higher number of local political boundary splits, with fif-
ty-three. Generally, the students demonstrated that it was possi-
ble to create a greater number of competitive districts. On aver-
age, the student plans generally had a number of competitive
districts similar to the commission and greater than the legisla-
ture.
Notable among the student plans is one proposed by a team of
students from William and Mary Law School.172 This student plan
was the first publicly released plan to demonstrate the concept of
the minority-influence congressional district. The plan has one
majority-minority district and minimum population deviations.
The plan scores among the most compact in its category, only be-
272. This plan won first place in the first category of the student competition that in-
cluded partisan fairness and electoral competition in addition to the governor's commis-
sion criteria, primarily for demonstrating how to increase minority representation. See
supra Table 1.
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hind plans from the University of Virginia and Christopher New-
port University. It splits forty-one local political boundaries, only
slightly more than the thirty-seven in the adopted plan. The plan
also has a 6-5 Republican split, and like the legislative and
IBARC plans that include the minority-influence district, it has
only two electorally competitive districts. The similarity with the
IBARC plan is not surprising, as the commission used the Wil-
liam and Mary Law School plan as a template for their work and
enlisted the students to help draw the congressional plans.
The legislative, IBARC, and student congressional plans that
include the minority-influence district demonstrate a potential
trade-off between creating an additional influence district and
competition. All of these plans were among the lowest in electoral
competition but also tended to score more highly on partisan bal-
ance. The district would be located in the Tidewater region in the
southeast portion of the state, stretching across rural areas along
the North Carolina border from Virginia Beach to Richmond.2 71 It
would also be adjacent to the south of the current minority-
majority district represented by Rep. Bobby Scott. By concentrat-
ing Democrats into the influence district, it creates an additional
Democratic district, while making surrounding predominantly
rural districts more Republican and less electorally competitive.
However, there appears only a suggestion of a broader trade-off
between partisan balance and competition, with the Virginia
Commonwealth University plan with six competitive districts
having only a 7-4 partisan split, compared to a plan drawn by a
University of Richmond team that had five competitive districts
and a 6-5 partisan split.
The numerous congressional plans demonstrate that the Re-
publican legislature had a choice to create a Republican-favored
congressional plan and was not mechanically following adminis-
trative criteria that resulted in a Republican-favored plan created
as a byproduct of Democrats' inefficient concentration in urban
areas. The second-most compact plan, one that has a majority-
minority district and has minimal population deviations, also has
a partisan split of 6-5 favoring the Republican Party compared to
the legislature's plan that also had one majority-minority district
and a minimal population deviation. The adopted plan's partisan
bias was not a consequence of favoring minimal splits of local po-
273. See IBARC REPORT, supra note 190, at 25.
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litical boundaries either. While the adopted plan scored highly in
this regard with thirty-seven splits, plans produced by the IBARC
and the students were simultaneously more compact, respected
the same or more political boundary splits, and also had a 6-5
partisan split favoring Republicans. Partisan balance in the con-
gressional plan thus was not constrained by geography.
No entity drew a plan with a 5-6 split favoring Democrats, so
there may be some modest truth to the claim that urban Demo-
crats are inefficiently concentrated within their urban communi-
ties from a redistricting standpoint. In Virginia, this would mani-
fest itself in Northern Virginia, a Democratic stronghold located
in a corner of a state: the ideal conditions for geographic con-
straints to disfavor Democrats. However, Virginia's single majori-
ty-minority district is overwhelmingly Democratic and the most
partisan district for either political party. It may be that the
Democrats are inefficiently concentrated within this district,
which is largely a rural, not urban, district. Since this majority-
minority district is required by the Voting Rights Act,274 and no
plans were evaluated without a majority-minority district, we
cannot know for certain if geography or the Voting Rights Act dis-
favored the creation of a plan more favorable to Democrats. And
since no pure Democratic gerrymander was drawn by any entity,
it is difficult to know how constraining geography and the Voting
Rights Act may be on Democratic fortunes.
C. Senate
Among the two chambers, the Senate redistricting was more
contentious than that of the House.275 Democratic Senator Janet
Howell and Republican Senator John Watkins offered competing
plans. The Democratic-controlled Senate adopted the Democratic
plan on a party line vote and the Republican-controlled House
agreed to a logroll whereby the two chambers' plans were pack-
aged into one bill to prevent Republican Governor McDonnell
from selectively vetoing the Senate plan.276 He vetoed the entire
274. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14-15 (2009) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(2006)).
275. The discussion which follows in this section will reference Table 2, supra, and
Figure 2, supra.
276. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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package but cited only concerns with the Senate plan in his veto
message, particularly noting Senator Watkins's plan, not the
plans proposed by his commission.277 The two chambers revised
their plans and submitted a new bill for both chambers to Gover-
nor McDonnell, which he signed into law.278 Here, we examine
how the Democratic and Republican Senate plans differed, how
the Senate responded to the governor's veto, and how all of the
legislative plans compared with the IBARC and student plans.
We begin our Senate analysis with the legislative plans. In the
plots, we label the Democratic-favored vetoed plan 'V" and the
adopted plan "A". When the two plans are very similar on two
dimensions, for example, population equality and partisan bal-
ance, these two letters overlap considerably. Surrounding these
plans are precursors introduced during the legislative process
and modified in minor ways before passage. Senator Watkins's
Republican alternative is distinguished from both the vetoed and
adopted Democratic plans on many dimensions, perhaps most
visually apparent in the column of compactness measures, as the
Republican alternative was significantly more compact than ei-
ther Democratic plan, whereas the adopted plan was only modest-
ly more compact than the vetoed plan. The Republican proposal
split eighty-eight local political boundaries; Democrats were mod-
estly responsive to Governor McDonnell's veto by reducing the
number of local political boundary splits from 136 in the vetoed
plan to 124 in the adopted plan. The Republican alternative had a
population deviation of less than 1%, while both Democratic plans
had a deviation of approximately 4%. All legislative plans were
similar only in that they had five majority-minority African
American districts. Not surprisingly, the competing partisan
plans differed on their potential electoral effects. The Senate
Democratic caucus issued a press release noting that when the
vetoed plan was loaded into the DistrictBuilder software, it re-
ceived the highest score for partisan balance and was eighth in
terms of political competition.279 Indeed, both Democratic plans
had a 19-21 partisan split favoring the Republicans, while the
Republican plan had a 25-15 split, the most pro-Republican of
277. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
279. Press Release, Va. Senate Democratic Caucus, Website Gives Senate Redistricting
Plan High Marks (Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://www.vasenatedems.com (enter 'Web-
site gives senate redistricting" in search box and search "full site").
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any plan. The Republican plan had eight competitive districts,
while the Democrats' response to the veto resulted in a more
competitive plan: six in the vetoed plan and eight in the adopted
plan. In sum, Governor McDonnell's veto resulted in an adopted
plan that was slightly more compact, had twelve fewer local polit-
ical boundary splits, and had two more competitive districts than
the vetoed plan.
The governor's IBARC formally adopted two Senate plans,
known as the Two Percent and Three Percent Plans, names
which referred to the population deviations of each district from
the ideal-sized district, not the overall deviations, which would be
4% and 7%, respectively. The purpose of these plans was to illu-
minate a potential trade-off between population equality and re-
spect for local political boundaries.28 ° The Three Percent Plan
name was a slight misnomer since it had an overall population
deviation of 7%, a minimum deviation of negative 2.8%, and a
maximum deviation of 4.2%.281 The Two Percent Plan was more
aptly named, with an overall population deviation of 3.8%, a min-
imum deviation of negative 1.8%, and a maximum deviation of
1.9%.282 Both plans had nearly the same compactness, but as ex-
pected, the Two Percent Plan split seventy-two local political
boundaries while the Three Percent Plan split only fifty-nine. On-
ly a plan drawn by the William and Mary Law School team had
fewer local political boundary splits, with fifty-five, but this plan
also had a larger population deviation of 9.2%. The Two Percent
Plan was slightly more evenly balanced, with a 23-17 partisan
split favoring Republicans, while the Three Percent Plan had a
24-16 split. Both plans had eight competitive districts.
Compared to the legislative plans, the Two Percent Plan had a
4% overall population deviation, similar to the vetoed and adopt-
ed plans, while Senator Watkins's plan had a 1% deviation. The
Three Percent Plan had a larger deviation than all legislative
plans. The IBARC's plans were uniformly more compact and re-
spected more political boundaries than all legislative plans, even
Senator Watkins's proposal. Interestingly, the IBARC's plans
were in between the Democratic and Republican plans in terms of
partisan balance, with a 23-17 Republican split for the Two Per-
280. IBARC REPORT, supra note 190, at 21-22.
281. Id. at 34.
282. Id. at 31.
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cent Plan and a 24-16 split for the Three Percent Plan, and had
the same level of competition as the adopted plan and Republican
proposal, but more than the vetoed plan.
The student teams approached Senate redistricting with more
variety. Among the chief innovations were two plans drawn by a
University of Virginia team-one following the commission's cri-
teria and one following the original competition criteria-that
had six majority-minority African American districts compared
with five in all other plans.28 The IBARC was intrigued by this
approach but decided against recommending it because the Afri-
can American populations in the existing five districts were de-
creased from the levels as they existed in 2001, when the De-
partment of Justice last approved these districts."4 Without
further statistical analyses of racial voting patterns, it was im-
possible to know if these districts would violate section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act by regressing African American ability to elect
candidates of their choice. The original competition version of this
plan had the least population deviation of any plan, with an over-
all deviation of 0.1%. It was slightly less compact than Senator
Watkins's plan, but had 190 local political boundary splits, the
second highest of any plan.
The student plans also exhibited more variety among the other
administrative criteria. As noted above, a William and Mary Law
School student team devised a Senate plan that split the fewest
political boundaries (fifty-five) and was more compact than any
legislative or IBARC plan. A University of Mary Washington
team drew the most compact plan, which was slightly more com-
pact than the William and Mary Law School plan, but this plan
split many more political boundaries (137). Both plans had popu-
lation deviations just under 10%. The student plans had less
overall variance than the legislative plans on partisan balance,
ranging from a 22-18 Republican advantage to a 24-16 advantage,
but they also exhibited equal or greater levels of competition,
ranging from eight to eleven districts.
Overall, the commission and student Senate plans suggest that
an approach that emphasizes administrative criteria would result
in plans that are more compact and respect more political bound-
283. This concept won second place in the commission's criteria division. See supra Ta-
ble 2.
284. IBARC REPORT, supra note 190, at 20.
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aries. There is a suggestion of a tradeoff between population
equality and respecting local political boundaries, consistent with
the commission's experimentation, with the plans that respect
the most political boundaries also being those with the largest
population deviations. Keeping in mind that some of the student
plans explicitly attempted to achieve greater partisan balance
and competition by virtue of the competition judging criteria, the
non-legislative plans were more favorable to the Republicans
than the eventually adopted plan and less favorable than the Re-
publicans' legislative alternative. The non-legislative plans gen-
erally had equal or more competitive districts than the legislative
plans. Thus there is support for the proposition that Democrats
are inefficiently geographically distributed from a redistricting
standpoint, particularly since the best Democratic gerrymander
resulted only in a 21-19 split favoring Republicans. Geographic
constraints are perhaps more important when drawing smaller
legislative districts, since it is more difficult to connect urban
Democratic cores with outlying Republican areas than when
drawing large congressional districts. However, geography alone
is not to blame; student and commission plans existed that were
more compact than the Republican proposal, respected more po-
litical boundaries, were more evenly balanced, and had more
competitive districts. We also note that no plans were drawn
without consideration for the Voting Rights Act, which tends to
inefficiently concentrate Democrats into majority-minority dis-
tricts. Geography is perhaps a factor favoring Republicans, but if
Republicans had their way, they would push partisan advantage
above what geography alone might net them.
D. House of Delegates
The House of Delegates redistricting was the least contentious
of the three legislative bodies. Here, Democrats reached a biparti-
san compromise with the Republican leadership and did not offer
an alternative Democratic plan into the legislative record.285 The
cluster of legislative plans around the vetoed and adopted plans
represent minor modifications to plans that were considered as
the House plan wound its way through the legislative process.286
285. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
286. The discussion which follows in this section will reference Table 3, supra, and
[Vol. 47:771
REDISTRICTING BATTLES
The final adopted plan is slightly more compact and had one few-
er local political boundary split (197) than the vetoed plan (198).
In all other respects, the vetoed and adopted plans are essentially
identical: they both have twelve majority-minority African Amer-
ican districts, an overall population deviation just slightly less
than 2%, a Republican-favoring partisan split of 57-43, and twen-
ty-four competitive districts.
The IBARC and student plans suggest that the Democrats
could have introduced a more favorable plan, even if it likely
would have been rejected by the Republican controlled House.
The commission adopted two plans that varied primarily by the
number of majority-minority districts. Although Virginia adopted
a plan in 2001 with twelve such districts,"' the commission
demonstrated it was possible to create a thirteenth majority-
minority African American district and put forward two options:
one with twelve and one with thirteen majority-minority districts.
The Thirteen District Plan was the only plan with a thirteenth
minority-majority district. These plans had the same overall pop-
ulation deviation of slightly less than 4%. Both plans were highly
compact, scoring among the most compact of any plans, and sig-
nificantly more compact than the adopted legislative plan. These
plans varied otherwise, with the Twelve District Plan being
slightly more compact and having fewer splits (153) than the
Thirteen District Plan (156). The Twelve District Plan had a par-
tisan split of 55-45, while the Thirteen District Plan had a split of
56-44; the former had twenty-three competitive districts while
the latter had twenty-two. Compared to the adopted legislative
plan, the two IBARC options were more compact, split fewer po-
litical boundaries, were more evenly balanced, had higher popula-
tion deviations, and had either one or two fewer competitive dis-
tricts, depending on the plan.
The student plans are perhaps less instructive of the legal re-
districting alternatives. The one hundred House of Delegates dis-
tricts were the most demanding to draw, and thus fewer student
teams successfully produced plans. Furthermore, the organizers
only required students to draw at least eleven majority-minority
African American districts. The 2010 census revealed that the
number of House of Delegates majority-minority districts had de-
Figure 3, supra.
287. IBARC REPORT, supra note 190, at 35.
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creased from twelve to eleven as population had shifted during
the decade, though the twelfth district still had an African Amer-
ican population percentage in the mid-forties .28  Furthermore,
these twelve districts were under-populated compared to the ide-
al-sized district, presenting a further challenge to maintaining
the eleven majority-minority districts or restoring their number
to twelve.289 With these uncertainties, the organizers decided to
encourage students to explore options to enhance minority repre-
sentation, but only required plans to have eleven majority-
minority districts.
Undergraduate teams from George Mason University and the
University of Virginia created plans with twelve majority-
minority districts.290 The University of Virginia team's plan was
notable in that it had an overall population deviation of 1.4%, the
least of any plan. Compared to the adopted and commission plans
it was more evenly balanced with a 54-46 partisan split, and had
more competitive districts (twenty-seven). It was more compact
than the legislative plans, but less compact than the IBARC
plans. The plan also had a higher number of political boundary
splits (221) than either the legislative or IBARC plans. The
George Mason University team's plan had a large population de-
viation of 9.7%, the highest among any plan that had at least
twelve majority-minority districts. The plan was slightly less
compact than the University of Virginia team's plan but had few-
er splits of local political boundaries (168). The 168 splits were
more than the commission's plans but less than the adopted plan.
The plan was less evenly balanced than the University of Virginia
team's plan, with a 56-44 partisan split, and had fewer competi-
tive districts (twenty-four). Compared to the adopted plan, this
plan was more evenly balanced and had the same number of
competitive districts; depending on the commission plan, this
plan either had the same or less partisan balance and had one or
two more competitive districts.
288. Id.
289. See id. (highlighting the proposed majority-minority districts for the House redis-
tricting plan); H.B. 5005; New House Districts, VA. Div. LEGIS. SERVS. (Apr. 28, 2011),
available at http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010fRedistrictingPlans.aspx#28 (click
"PDF') (demonstrating that all twelve majority-minority districts had populations below
the ideal-sized district).
290. The George Mason University team's plan won first place in the original competi-
tion criteria division, while the University of Virginia team's plan won second place in the
commission criteria division. See supra Table 3.
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The remaining student plans had only eleven majority-
minority districts. They also all had greater population deviations
than the adopted plan. However, they illustrate that it was possi-
ble to draw compact plans with greater partisan balance and
competition than the adopted plan. One of these plans also had
fewer splits of local political boundaries than the adopted plan.
In summary with regards to the House of Representatives
plans, the student and particularly the IBARC plans demon-
strate, in contrast to the adopted plan, that plans could be devel-
oped that were more compact, respect more political boundaries,
have more minority representation, are more equally balanced,
and have more competitive districts (though the commission
plans had slighter fewer competitive districts than the adopted
plan). While many of the student and IBARC plans had greater
population deviations than the adopted plan, a student plan
demonstrated that a lower population deviation was possible, alt-
hough perhaps sacrificing more local boundaries to splits.
The least politically balanced plan was the plan adopted by the
legislature. From an analytical standpoint, it is unfortunate that
neither a maximal Democratic nor Republican gerrymander was
introduced in the legislature, and thus we do not know what
these plans might have looked like. While a more neutral ap-
proach offered by the commission was more politically balanced,
we again note that none of the plans had a majority of districts
favoring Democrats. While this suggests that geographic distribu-
tion of Democrats works against their interests, geography alone
does not explain the result, as the commission's plans were more
balanced than the legislature's adopted plan. We reiterate that no
plans were drawn without consideration for the Voting Rights
Act. Perhaps the fact that no plan had a majority of Democratic-
leaning districts explains why Democrats and Republicans were
willing to work together on a plan. Republicans were safe in their
majority and did not need to expand it, while Democrats knew
that even the best plan they could engineer still would likely
leave them short of a majority. Instead of introducing a Demo-
cratic gerrymander, Democrats were satisfied with introducing
the University of Richmond student plan as a bill,"1 a plan that
291. See 2010 Redistricting Plans, supra note 192.
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was more balanced with a 55-45 split but had only eleven majori-
ty-minority African American districts and a large population de-
viation of 9.8%.
IV. CONCLUSION
The redistricting process in Virginia, like in many other states,
has been embroiled in political and racial battles over the dec-
ades. In the past fifty years, the battle lines have shifted from
within-party fighting among Democrats primarily over malappor-
tionment favoring rural interests over urban interests, to battles
over voting rights. As the Commonwealth drifted in a Republican
direction, Democrats shifted their sights to aim at Republicans.
At first this was a defensive holding action, but recently Virginia
has drifted back in a Democratic direction to be a presidential
battleground state, 2 with Democrats briefly regaining a Senate
majority only to have it slip to a tie in the 2011 elections 9 With
the potent power of redistricting at their disposal, we would not
be surprised if Republicans attempt to replace the Democratic
gerrymander of the Senate with a more favorable plan, as the
adopted Democratic plan provides Democrats an opportunity to
reclaim the chamber in future elections. If such an action occurs,
we would also not be surprised if litigation followed.
If Republicans re-redistrict the Virginia Senate, political pres-
sure will likely mount for reform. Redistricting has been reformed
surprisingly often in the history of the Commonwealth through
constitutional revision. Furthermore, two governors' commissions
have been convened to highlight reform-one in 1961 and another
in 2011. The plans put forth by these commissions suffered simi-
lar fates and were ignored by the legislature. Governor McDon-
nell might have demanded through a veto that the legislature
draw plans to better satisfy the current constitutional require-
ments of population equality and compactness. Our analysis sug-
gests that plans more compact than those Governor McDonnell
signed into law would have benefited his party in the Senate but
would have hurt his party in the House of Delegates. Perhaps for
292. Chuck Raasch, Virginia Solidifies Its Role as a New Swing State, USA TODAY,
Nov. 7, 2012, at 9A.
293. See Michael Sluss, Democrat Sues to Stop Republicans' Senate Takeover, ROANOKE
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, at All.
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this reason, Governor McDonnell focused instead on Republican
Senator Watkins's plan while eschewing his commission's pro-
posed plans as a baseline for improvement to the Senate's plans.
Our analysis also shows that Senate Democrats only made mod-
est changes to their plan in response to the governor's veto, which
he accepted, suggesting that Governor McDonnell had no real ap-
petite for redistricting reform despite his campaign pledges.
The General Assembly is the only viable pathway for Virginia
constitutional revision, and that pathway appears unlikely. A re-
form bill that recently unanimously passed the Senate died an
ignominious death in a House sub-committee. Another governor
facing a similar situation of a divided state legislature during the
recent redistricting used his veto power to extract reform conces-
sions from his legislature. In exchange for New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo's signature to the state legislative plans, the New
York legislature passed a bill establishing a bipartisan redistrict-
ing commission and setting in motion a revision to the state con-
stitution."9 While several prominent Virginia politicians have
called for redistricting reform, the best chance for future reform
likely rests with a steadfast governor.
Our analysis suggests that reform in the form of an independ-
ent commission that strictly follows a set of administrative crite-
ria likely would modestly benefit Republicans. None of the plans
examined here for any legislative body-be it Congress or either
state legislative chamber-had a majority of Democratic-leaning
districts. We suspect that this modest partisan bias emerges as a
consequence of how Democrats are inefficiently concentrated in
urban areas from a redistricting standpoint, and that this bias is
more prevalent in the smallest House of Delegates districts.
While congressional and Senate plans exist with only one district
worth of imbalance favoring Republicans, the most balanced
House of Delegates plan still had fifty-four Republican-leaning
districts.29 ' However, because all plans examined here included
majority-minority districts, we cannot rule out the possibility that
the Voting Rights Act might function in a manner to inefficiently
concentrate Democrats into majority-minority districts.
294. Thomas Kaplan, An Update on New York Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012,
at A23; see S.B. 6698, 234th Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2012).
295. For a similar conclusion regarding congressional and state legislative districts in
five Midwestern states, see MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, MIDWEST MAPPING PROJECT, availa-
ble at http://elections.gmu.edulMidwestMapping-Project.pdf.
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While an independent commission would likely produce a plan
that modestly benefited Republicans, our analysis suggests that
the plans it generated would not benefit Republicans as greatly
as the optimal Republican gerrymander. The existence of com-
mission and student plans that are more compact than Republi-
can plans and more politically balanced dispels the assertion that
Republican redistricting advantage is solely, or even predomi-
nantly, a function of where Democratic voters tend to live. We
suspect then that if Republicans redraw the Senate districts, fu-
ture Virginia reform in the New York mold would most likely
arise with a Democratic governor, as a Republican governor
would be unlikely to harm his legislative allies through a veto
threat.
We suggest authors of future reform proposals consider how
various criteria are traded off against one another. There is likely
a tension, particularly among state legislative districts, among
greater population equality, compactness, and respect for local
political boundaries. If respect for local political boundaries is
subsumed beneath the other two criteria, a much greater number
of these boundaries will likely be crossed by districts. Further-
more, the student plans suggest that, in comparison to the legis-
lative plans, administrative criteria may be balanced against po-
litical outcomes of partisan balance and competition without
significant detriment to the administrative criteria. If reformers
wish to minimize potential electoral effects of blindly following
administrative criteria, political goals should be explicitly includ-
ed among the criteria, not subsumed beneath them.
We hope that any future redistricting reform discussion will in-
clude a role for the public in the line-drawing process. The com-
mission and participation of students in the current round of Vir-
ginia's redistricting demonstrates that redistricting does not have
to be left up to the "professionals." Enabled by appropriate tech-
nology, students were able to create legal redistricting plans that
demonstrated a much wider range of possibilities; generally were
better than the legislature's plans, as measured by formal redis-
tricting criteria; and were much more competitive and balanced
than any of the plans actually adopted. Also significant are the
ways the non-legislative plans demonstrated to potentially en-
hance minority representation. When many eyes look at a prob-
lem, it may be that someone will discover a solution that no one
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has thought of before. This is particularly true with redistricting,
an extremely complex mathematical problem. Harnessing the
mind power of the crowd will promote a more robust discussion of
options than any one entity can devise on its own.

